Neil
New
For sake of conversation, I wanted to put forth my opinion that is against Australian Zombies, or the idea of deriving the metaphysical possibility of beings just like us physically and functionally that have absolutely no conscious experience, which is then used to establish an ontological gap due to the purported ability to separate the two in different possible worlds.
I will just say, I don't like possible world arguments. I think they are terrible arguments. I saw Sean Carroll give a lecture on why God is not an explanatory hypothesis, and he talked about "possible worlds" of single particles moving through classical space. Really? That's not a possible world. That's lines and dots on a piece of paper. I can conceive of the world of Lord of the Rings, but that means absolutely nothing as to metaphysical possibility.
More specifically, I think it ignores fundamental physical theory. Granted, quantum theory is very controversial in its interpretation, even seen here on this board. I can put forth reasons for why I think the hard problem in neuroscience actually does offer compelling reasons on which to judge different interpretations, which, I think, combined with all empirical evidence from the field of QT itself, offers a compelling case for the von Neumann interpretation.
Within this interpretation, I cannot grant the possibility of beings just like us that have zero conscious experience. I also cannot grant the possibility of a world like ours with absolutely no conscious beings in it. For within the VNI, conscious experience is collapse of the wavefunction, and macro collapse events occur as a result of von Neumann chains. Without a conscious observer of some type, then there is no wavefunction collapse and no definite states, i.e. no world like ours.
And beings like us, since they are living, appear to necessarily be conscious. The negentropy of life seems like the most essential aspect of what is necessary to give rise to conscious experience, and if something is exactly like us then it also must necessarily be conscious. I cannot conceive of a non-conscious biological entity existing in a definite state like we do.
So based on this, I reject the possible worlds argument for Australian Zombies, and by rejecting this premise, I reject the conclusion of an ontological gap.
I will just say, I don't like possible world arguments. I think they are terrible arguments. I saw Sean Carroll give a lecture on why God is not an explanatory hypothesis, and he talked about "possible worlds" of single particles moving through classical space. Really? That's not a possible world. That's lines and dots on a piece of paper. I can conceive of the world of Lord of the Rings, but that means absolutely nothing as to metaphysical possibility.
More specifically, I think it ignores fundamental physical theory. Granted, quantum theory is very controversial in its interpretation, even seen here on this board. I can put forth reasons for why I think the hard problem in neuroscience actually does offer compelling reasons on which to judge different interpretations, which, I think, combined with all empirical evidence from the field of QT itself, offers a compelling case for the von Neumann interpretation.
Within this interpretation, I cannot grant the possibility of beings just like us that have zero conscious experience. I also cannot grant the possibility of a world like ours with absolutely no conscious beings in it. For within the VNI, conscious experience is collapse of the wavefunction, and macro collapse events occur as a result of von Neumann chains. Without a conscious observer of some type, then there is no wavefunction collapse and no definite states, i.e. no world like ours.
And beings like us, since they are living, appear to necessarily be conscious. The negentropy of life seems like the most essential aspect of what is necessary to give rise to conscious experience, and if something is exactly like us then it also must necessarily be conscious. I cannot conceive of a non-conscious biological entity existing in a definite state like we do.
So based on this, I reject the possible worlds argument for Australian Zombies, and by rejecting this premise, I reject the conclusion of an ontological gap.