You don't seem to get my point that most physical theories perform a role at a particular time in the development of science, and then become obsolete.
Imagine how useless it would have been if Newton had come out with GR! Nobody could have calculated with it - it would have looked like pure mysticism (maybe it still does :) ) - and physics would have stagnated.
You see - even you find it impossible not to think in Dualist terms - under Idealism "the world" is just another part of its imagination. Even if Idealism is the ultimate explanation, it is no use as a theory right now - doing so is like trying to use Schroedinger's equation to understand car mechanics - yes, in theory it applies to everything including cars, but that doesn't mean it would be of any use!
To me science is currently massively lopsided. The physical side is well developed, the mental side is hardly developed at all. To advance on the mental front, science needs to think less globally - just take small tentative steps. The grand theories can come later.
David
Naturally, I respect anything you have to say, David, and generally we agree on so many issues, like your point about physical theories having a limited shelf life; but I'm not quite sure what you're trying to say by that. Idealism isn't a theory of physics but of metaphysics, which in essence also applies to Materialism and Dualism.
It's not so much that I find it impossible not to
think in dualistic terms (though that's admittedly a daunting task), as that I find it as difficult as anyone else to
express myself in non-dualistic terms. Language is embedded in the materialistic/dualistic paradigm.
There's no such thing as (Idealist) monistic language; we can't completely avoid any linkage with concepts of matter, space and time in language. There's no idealistic alternative to the word
thing, for example. As soon as one utters the word, one is implying the idea of separation and distinction, but what choice does one have? One can try putting words in quotes, but with limited success. One can try using mathematics (which unfortunately I have little facility with), but again, in physics at least, that is built around assumptions of concreteness. Is there such a thing as pure mathematics, completely divorced from human perception? I don't know: you tell me.
We
experience the world through perception of apparent objects, which is why we have nouns to name and distinguish them. A truly Idealist, monistic language wouldn't have any nouns. It wouldn't talk in terms of
things, so much as
ideas, amongst which there can more legitimately be distinctions. Although MAL would be One, perhaps there could be said to be distinctions in its thoughts, one of which is that of something that can be perceived as a human being. The nearest one can get, I suppose, is by thinking in Platonic terms: of
things as more or less imperfect instantiations of eternal and perfect Platonic Ideas.
It's all very well talking about taking baby steps, but we appear to have regressed: Plato was expounding his philosophy of Idealism over two thousand years ago, after all. I don't often quote Wikipedia, but here's what it has to say about Platonic forms:
Forms
The meaning of the term εἶδος (eidos), "visible form", and related terms μορφή (morphē), "shape",[8] and φαινόμενα (phainomena), "appearances", from φαίνω (phainō), "shine", Indo-European *bhā-,[9] remained stable over the centuries until the beginning of philosophy, when they became equivocal, acquiring additional specialized philosophic meanings. The pre-Socratic philosophers, starting with Thales, noted that appearances change, and began to ask what the thing that changes "really" is. The answer was substance, which stands under the changes and is the actually existing thing being seen. The status of appearances now came into question. What is the form really and how is that related to substance?
Thus, the theory of matter and form (today's hylomorphism) was born. Starting with at least Plato and possibly germinal in some of the presocratics the forms were considered as being "in" something else, which Plato called nature (physis). The latter seemed as carved "wood",[10] ὕλη (hyle) in Greek, corresponding to materia in Latin, from which the English word "matter" is derived,[11] shaped by receiving (or exchanging) forms.
The Forms are expounded upon in Plato's dialogues and general speech, in that every object or quality in reality has a form: dogs, human beings, mountains, colors, courage, love, and goodness. Form answers the question, "What is that?" Plato was going a step further and asking what Form itself is. He supposed that the object was essentially or "really" the Form and that the phenomena were mere shadows mimicking the Form; that is, momentary portrayals of the Form under different circumstances. The problem of universals – how can one thing in general be many things in particular – was solved by presuming that Form was a distinct singular thing but caused plural representations of itself in particular objects. For example, Parmenides states, "Nor, again, if a person were to show that all is one by partaking of one, and at the same time many by partaking of many, would that be very astonishing. But if he were to show me that the absolute one was many, or the absolute many one, I should be truly amazed."[12]:p129 Matter is considered particular in itself.
These Forms are the essences of various objects: they are that without which a thing would not be the kind of thing it is. For example, there are countless tables in the world but the Form of tableness is at the core; it is the essence of all of them.[13] Plato's Socrates held that the world of Forms is transcendent to our own world (the world of substances) and also is the essential basis of reality. Super-ordinate to matter, Forms are the most pure of all things. Furthermore, he believed that true knowledge/intelligence is the ability to grasp the world of Forms with one's mind.[14]
A Form is aspatial (transcendent to space) and atemporal (transcendent to time). Atemporal means that it does not exist within any time period, rather it provides the formal basis for time. It therefore formally grounds beginning, persisting and ending. It is neither eternal in the sense of existing forever, nor mortal, of limited duration. It exists transcendent to time altogether.[15] Forms are aspatial in that they have no spatial dimensions, and thus no orientation in space, nor do they even (like the point) have a location.[16] They are non-physical, but they are not in the mind. Forms are extra-mental (i.e. real in the strictest sense of the word).[17]
A Form is an objective "blueprint" of perfection.[18] The Forms are perfect themselves because they are unchanging. For example, say we have a triangle drawn on a blackboard. A triangle is a polygon with 3 sides. The triangle as it is on the blackboard is far from perfect. However, it is only the intelligibility of the Form "triangle" that allows us to know the drawing on the chalkboard is a triangle, and the Form "triangle" is perfect and unchanging. It is exactly the same whenever anyone chooses to consider it; however, the time is that of the observer and not of the triangle.
You can see that describing the theory of forms necessarily employs dualistic language, but still, one can get a basic sense of what Plato's Idealism is about. A human being is an imperfect instantiation of the perfect idea of a human being. Instantiated
where? It's a natural enough question given the prison of language. Every
thing has to exist some
where in language, and so that sets up the idea of space, which is thereby reified in our thoughts, as is matter and time, because we
perceive instantiations as enduring, solid objects.