Discussion in 'Skeptiko Shows' started by Alex, Mar 10, 2015.
agreed... great point. sometimes all this quantum stuff can obfuscate the immensity of the mystery.
He's surely not talking about consciousness here? Also, it's the use of the exact phrase "Biological robot". In what context did he say that?
what do you think he's talking about?
Genes? The mechanics of evolution?
Sorry Bishop, but I think you are splitting hairs here. If I recall, Chalmers once referenced Dennett's propensity to call humans "biological robots" by saying something to the effect of Dennett seemingl like a biological robot since there doesn't seem to be any consciousness involved in such a statement. I will see if I can find the quote.
Even still, while I understand that when it comes to prominent figures and what they said or didn't say, we need to avoid putting words in their mouth, I find this is often a tactic of skeptics (not necessarily you, Bishop, since I have no idea if you call yourself one) where they argue over definitions and exact wording. I see it a lot where someone says '"where did I say exactly that?"or "where did so and so say exactly that?" When it's obvious to anyone capable of thought what that person meant. Like reading between the lines. Conjecture or inferrence if you will. Funny how skeptics have no problem with conjecture or inferrence, as long as it is their pet philosophy or figure heads engaging in it.
Yes, I may be splitting hairs! I'm just bringing it up because Alex says with great frequency that Dawkins said we are nothing more than biological robots, seemingly as it relates to consciousness. As in here:
That's all good and nice, I guess, but I haven't been able to find this anywhere. I don't even like Dawkins! I just think it's interesting to repeat something over and over and over again so emphatically if it's not something he actually said, or without some kind of proper context. As far as I can tell every time he's ever said anything about us being like robots it has to do with genes, in the same way we sometimes think about how the physical body is mechanical. If Alex has a problem with Dawkins because he's an atheist, materialist turd I could care less. But it seems odd to say he said something out of context.
Yeah, I think he is inferring here. I'm not sure he really has ever said "humans are biological robots" either. I did find this:
Bolding is mine. While not exactly "biological robot", he's kind of saying that when you get down to it, neural processes are like little machines, each performing a specific function, but working together emerges as what we call "consciousness". Granted, this is my interpretation, so I could be wrong. Honestly, I find he shrouds so much of his ideas in doublespeak and pseudointellectual posturing, I'm not sure just what in the hell he's actually trying to say. Maybe I'm just too dumb to understand him, I dunno. He certainly comes across an arrogant ass though, and that can be really offputting. Maybe its not so much his ideas people dislike (if you can understand them) but his delivery.
Omg, I just realized you asked about Dawkins, not Dennett. Sorry Bishop. I am a dum dum.
I was gonna ask about that!
What do you mean when you say thoughts "have no real power of their own"?
And specifically what do you mean by "power"?
And why would you even reach the conclusion that if a thought was an outcome of a physical process, that it would lack the ability to have an impact on anything, be it physical or non-physical?
Are you claiming that thoughts have no power "full stop"? Or are you saying that they have no power in this particular scenario because they were the byproduct of a physical brain?
Maybe I'm missing something here but, it feels to me like you are building a logical argument akin to how many fairies can fit on the head of a pin. The assertions you are making are based on fuzzy, rather undefined particulars. I'm not hair-splitting here. I'm finding it impossible to get my arms around exactly what you are claiming.
Each step in a logical argument should stand on it's own and be provable (or not) on it's own merit. Right?
Help me out here. I really would like to illuminate this topic once and for all.
Here's a quote from Dawkins' The Selfish Gene:
Could the materialist argument run something like this...?
1. We know that evrything the brain does alters it slightly
the brain changes continuously simply by functioning normally
2. The brain produces consciousness (awareness and thoughts)
thus the brain produces the meditative thinking or functioning that alters itself
(another commenter referred to it in terms of a feedback loop)
Q. is the thinking changing the brain; or is the brain changing itself by thinking?
I don't understand what you mean by this.
Does it matter? What ability do thoughts have to do work within the materialist paradigm? Thoughts are an epiphenomenon of the brain according to reductionist materialism. So, really, that's the heart of the problem, right? What are thoughts? How do they come about? The physicalist theories are lacking because it requires the "creation" so to speak of consciousness (thoughts) out of blind, nondirected molecular interactions. Logically, this doesn't really make sense. Like Chalmers said, let's say that I can create a doppelganger of myself, complete with behaviors and mannerisms that are identical to myself. To the outside world, there would be no way to distinguish me from it. You could even put us both in the most sophisticated brain scanners available, and you still would see no difference between me and it. So consciousness must be some sort of something extra. Something as yet unidentified, that is capable of doing work on the physical. I fully understand this is promissory, not unlike promissory materialism. But it logically makes more sense, to me, since at one time we didn't know gravity existed, we didn't know about radio waves, x-rays, ultraviolet, etc. etc. until our science became sophisticated enough to create machines to detect them. I see no reason why consciousness couldn't be the same. OTOH, maybe it's nothing like what we think and is unknowable in the way we normally think of things as being knowable.
Yes, exactly. He's not talking about consciousness at all in that quote. He's talking about genes, like I mentioned earlier.
I won't belabor this, because it's not worth it. But just remember next time Alex talks about Dawkins making claims about us being "biological robots" it's not in regard to consciousness. It's out of context.
I'm happy to be proven wrong if someone can dig up a quote from Dawkins about consciousness and robots.
Sorry. Maybe I was being obtuse. What I meant was that you are creating an argument that on it's face appears to be logical and cogent, but upon closer investigation it is based on unsubstantiatable details. Saying that "thoughts have no power" is a meaningless statement unless you can be more clear about what you mean.
I contend that thoughts may have great "power". Certainly enough to change the physical wiring in the brain. And I contend that a materialist could make the same statement while still being true to their core materialist belief system. If one thinks that thought is an outcome of molecules, it doesn't mean that those same molecules aren't involved with subsequent "thinking" (via some molecular cogitation) about what was just thought of a moment ago. This continuous feedback loop could exist in a material or non-material realm couldn't it?
None of what you have said here seems to pertain to the simple statement that neuroplasticity or lack thereof has a profound influence in the brain=mind question. I'm not claiming that materialism is correct. I'm simply saying that it isn't invalidated by the brain being affected by a thought pattern.
My contention is simple:
I think that it is perfectly reasonable to think that the brain can be physically affected by thought, and that this is not in conflict with either materialistic or most "non-physical centric" paradigms.
I have not seen a set of logical points which would lead one to the conclusion you (and Alex and others) seem to have reached. And I am challenging someone/anyone here to provide such a "proof" for us to read and discuss. Preferably one that isn't a lot of arm waving and links to volumes of pontification. If possible, the proof should be simple and clear and not require a PhD to understand.
Let me prime the pump by saying: when I read the passage above am I right to reduce it to the following?
A materialist can't accept neuroplasticity because the thoughts occurring in the brain "aren't real" and lacking being real, they don't have the ability to interact with physical matter..
Do I have this right? Is this your basic contention?
That's a hard question to answer. Some materialists contend that consciousness is an epiphenomenon of the brain, meaning consciousness arises from physical processes in the brain, but the idea of the self and personal volition is an illusion. I was deducing from this the idea that since thoughts are an epiphenomenon of the brain, hence illusory, by definition they cannot have a physical effect. I think what you are saying is that even though thoughts as an epiphenomenon do not have a physical effect per se, the physical processes responsible for bringing about the illusion of consciousness could have a physical effect. My question is, if this is true, how is this process directed. Through mindfulness and meditation, the brain can physically be changed. What, then is directing this change? It cannot be any kind of volitional will since that would be an illusion.
Beyond the responses I've already given, I don't know any other way to put it. Have you read Dr. Jeffrey Schwartz's book The Mind and the Brain? If not, I highly recommend it. Perhaps he elucidates the concept better than I can.
Yeah, I can see that. Perhaps it's a matter of interpretation?
If consciousness defies the materialist view. Then meditation does and everything that follows. The cause of intention that can create a chain of detrminiastic effects does also.
BTW Richard Dawkins I believe, thinks consciousness is an emergent property of the brain, ergo emergent property of genetics.
Also his selfish gene concept has been refuted. A biological robot is inherantly dualistic, as it requires programing and transfer of information via representations that have no physical relation to the things they represent. A biological robot proponent must show how software is a natural phenomena derivable from the laws of physics. Even then the laws of physics are an enigma.
What a silly world.
Again, I think it's important that we don't rail against a physicalist position that does not exist - I can barely think of a bigger waste of time! I don't believe they are saying that brain processes (thoughts, perceptions, etc) are illusory. Almost by definition a physicalist would consider them physical . The illusion is that when all these thousands upon thousands of processes are happening together, healthily and simultaneously, it feels like.... well... "you".
Sheldrake tells Dennet the facts. A biological robot is inherantly dualistic. Information is not matter or energy. Also tying in the selfish gene here too.and sory Danny boy the selfish gene has been falsified.
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