Ian Wardell
New
Someone linked to this paper in a facebook group (Human Consciousness project).
I'm not sure that this paper is really saying anything. First of all the author Thomas Sturm gives no actual arguments to suppose reductive materialism is true but merely contents himself with giving counter-arguments to the arguments opposing reductive materialism. Secondly these counter-arguments do not seem to me to be in fact counter-arguments at all, but merely beg the question by assuming the truth of reductive materialism at the outset.
He tries to defend the identity thesis. A large part of his counter-arguments boils down to the fact that just because 2 apparent things do not appear to be one and the same thing, this does not entail they are not. He justifies this by giving examples like Farrokh Pluto Bulsara and Freddy Mercury being one and the very same person.
However with the examples he gives we can independently follow the paths of both things and see that their paths through space-time are one and the same. We cannot do this with a brain state and a particular conscious experience. For one thing we cannot follow the conscious experience through space-time since it does not have a location (or at least we can only say it has a location by transparently begging the question and asserting it has a location since it is one and the same thing as the brain event).
Secondly the conscious experience has absolutely nothing in common with the object or physical state it is said to be identical with. Physical objects states or processes have properties such as mass, location, charge or are wholly characterised by structure and dynamics. And of course they are objective and discernible form the 3rd person perspective. Conscious experiences, on the other hand, are characterised by the qualitative and wholly lack any physical properties.
Therefore to say they are the same is vacuous -- it's not actually saying anything. If they neither share the same location not have any properties in common whatsoever, then by definition they are not identical.
Looking at reply 2 in response to the explanatory gap argument his argument appears to be that our raw conscious experiences or qualia seem to have causal effects, therefore qualia can be wholly reduced to a functional analysis.
This certainly appears to be true of the physical world. At least from a scientific perspective there's nothing more to an entity or process over and above it's causal powers to affect its environment and hence will be susceptible to a functional analysis.
However this is not the case with our phenomenal consciousness or qualia. Certainly my conscious experiences, for example my emotions, have a causal impact on the world. However it is asinine in the extreme to suppose that my emotions are nothing but such causal powers. An emotion such as fear is not constituted by my behavior, but rather by the raw emotion experienced.
In fact with this argument the author is simply transparently begging the question again.
The existence of phenomenal consciousness necessitates the falsity of reductive materialism. This of course does not rule out the possibility of non-reductive materialism being correct, and certainly doesn't rule out the possibility that the brain creates consciousness. But it is false to say they are one and the same thing or process or state.
OK skeptics (or anyone else), what am I not understanding?
I'm not sure that this paper is really saying anything. First of all the author Thomas Sturm gives no actual arguments to suppose reductive materialism is true but merely contents himself with giving counter-arguments to the arguments opposing reductive materialism. Secondly these counter-arguments do not seem to me to be in fact counter-arguments at all, but merely beg the question by assuming the truth of reductive materialism at the outset.
He tries to defend the identity thesis. A large part of his counter-arguments boils down to the fact that just because 2 apparent things do not appear to be one and the same thing, this does not entail they are not. He justifies this by giving examples like Farrokh Pluto Bulsara and Freddy Mercury being one and the very same person.
However with the examples he gives we can independently follow the paths of both things and see that their paths through space-time are one and the same. We cannot do this with a brain state and a particular conscious experience. For one thing we cannot follow the conscious experience through space-time since it does not have a location (or at least we can only say it has a location by transparently begging the question and asserting it has a location since it is one and the same thing as the brain event).
Secondly the conscious experience has absolutely nothing in common with the object or physical state it is said to be identical with. Physical objects states or processes have properties such as mass, location, charge or are wholly characterised by structure and dynamics. And of course they are objective and discernible form the 3rd person perspective. Conscious experiences, on the other hand, are characterised by the qualitative and wholly lack any physical properties.
Therefore to say they are the same is vacuous -- it's not actually saying anything. If they neither share the same location not have any properties in common whatsoever, then by definition they are not identical.
Looking at reply 2 in response to the explanatory gap argument his argument appears to be that our raw conscious experiences or qualia seem to have causal effects, therefore qualia can be wholly reduced to a functional analysis.
This certainly appears to be true of the physical world. At least from a scientific perspective there's nothing more to an entity or process over and above it's causal powers to affect its environment and hence will be susceptible to a functional analysis.
However this is not the case with our phenomenal consciousness or qualia. Certainly my conscious experiences, for example my emotions, have a causal impact on the world. However it is asinine in the extreme to suppose that my emotions are nothing but such causal powers. An emotion such as fear is not constituted by my behavior, but rather by the raw emotion experienced.
In fact with this argument the author is simply transparently begging the question again.
The existence of phenomenal consciousness necessitates the falsity of reductive materialism. This of course does not rule out the possibility of non-reductive materialism being correct, and certainly doesn't rule out the possibility that the brain creates consciousness. But it is false to say they are one and the same thing or process or state.
OK skeptics (or anyone else), what am I not understanding?