Dennet Debunked?

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But if you make a physical copy of a human and leave behind consciousness (and that's another issue), then cannot detect any difference whatsoever, it suggests that the consciousness was epiphenomenal. In particular, the consciousness had nothing to do with the human's thoughts and talk about consciousness.


Because those physical processes have downstream effects.

~~ Paul
When I first encountered p zombies, I thought they were supposed to be us. That is, I thought the difficulty would lie in distinguishing ourselves from a p zombie (which means the p zombie includes "thoughts and talk about consciousness). I see that with the Michael Graziano interview this idea is in play, where the p zombie's thoughts and talk about consciousness are the result of giving the p zombie a "theory of mind". Our consciousness then becomes a story we tell ourselves, after the fact, to rationalize our actions. We haven't ever demonstrated that our thoughts preceed our actions, right? I'm having trouble figuring out how we would be able to demonstrate this, though.

Linda
 
When I first encountered p zombies, I thought they were supposed to be us. That is, I thought the difficulty would lie in distinguishing ourselves from a p zombie (which means the p zombie includes "thoughts and talk about consciousness). I see that with the Michael Graziano interview this idea is in play, where the p zombie's thoughts and talk about consciousness are the result of giving the p zombie a "theory of mind". Our consciousness then becomes a story we tell ourselves, after the fact, to rationalize our actions. We haven't ever demonstrated that our thoughts preceed our actions, right? I'm having trouble figuring out how we would be able to demonstrate this, though.
One thought can certainly precede a related action. For example, I might decide at noon to have lunch at 12:30. The question is whether the decision preceded the initial thought, as you say.

One issue with zombies is the question of how they come to be. If they are created by making a copy of just the physical aspects of our world, then if it's a physicalist world, there is nothing left behind. If it's a dualist world, something is left behind. On the other hand, if I'm not copying anything but simply imagining a new world full of zombies, you could argue that I ought to be able to imagine a world just like ours except without consciousness. But how am I to imagine that the zombies speak of consciousness just like us? By adding some brain module that says all the right things? But then the zombie is distinguishable from a human.

~~ Paul
 
One thought can certainly precede a related action. For example, I might decide at noon to have lunch at 12:30. The question is whether the decision preceded the initial thought, as you say.

I guess I should have said "thoughts preceed the related brain activity".

One issue with zombies is the question of how they come to be. If they are created by making a copy of just the physical aspects of our world, then if it's a physicalist world, there is nothing left behind. If it's a dualist world, something is left behind. On the other hand, if I'm not copying anything but simply imagining a new world full of zombies, you could argue that I ought to be able to imagine a world just like ours except without consciousness. But how am I to imagine that the zombies speak of consciousness just like us? By adding some brain module that says all the right things? But then the zombie is distinguishable from a human.

Did you mean indistinguishable? I think Graziano's point was that adding a "theory of mind" module - where the zombie attributes agency to others - may lead it to attribute agency to itself.

Linda
 
Did you mean indistinguishable? I think Graziano's point was that adding a "theory of mind" module - where the zombie attributes agency to others - may lead it to attribute agency to itself.
No, I meant distinguishable. If we start adding modules to produce the behaviors attributed to consciousness, then we can distinguish a zombie from a human by looking for the modules. They are supposed to be indistinguishable.

~~ Paul
 
No, I meant distinguishable. If we start adding modules to produce the behaviors attributed to consciousness, then we can distinguish a zombie from a human by looking for the modules. They are supposed to be indistinguishable.

~~ Paul
Ah, I understand.

Well, humans also have the "theory of mind" module...

Linda
 
The claim that consciousness cannot be brain processes is often based on the idea that consciousness "is just not like" physical processes.

Not my case. I believe that consciousness cannot be brain processes because there is evidence of psyches without brains or psyches at some point did not have enough functional brain as NDEs, apparitions, mediumship and people seem to remember their past lives, although consciousness can be a physical process in some sense.
 
Not my case. I believe that consciousness cannot be brain processes because there is evidence of psyches without brains or psyches at some point did not have enough functional brain as NDEs, apparitions, mediumship and people seem to remember their past lives, although consciousness can be a physical process in some sense.
Right, so are disembodied psyches physical?

~~ Paul
 
Dennett's poor arguments have been extensively critiqued by Uwe Meixner in his book "The Two Sides of Being: A Reassessment of Psycho-Physical Dualism".

The critiques are conveniently summarized in Mohrhoff's review of Meixner, at http://anti-matters.org/articles/129/public/129-204-1-PB.pdf, with Part II at http://anti-matters.org/articles/142/public/142-250-1-PB.pdf .

Thanks for these, I'm finally getting to them. While I have some hang ups with dualism, for the usual philosophical reasons, I do admire your and Nbtruthman's knowledge on the subject and will go through the recommended material.

Ideally I'll pick up the actual book, though I still need to finish a few others recommended around here.
 
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Feser provides some elucidation on the P-Zombie concept:

Zombies: A Shopper’s Guide

A “zombie,” in the philosophical sense of the term, is a creature physically and behaviorally identical to a human being but devoid of any sort of mental life. That’s somewhat imprecise, in part because the notion of a zombie could also cover creatures physically and behaviorally identical to some non-human type of animal but devoid of whatever mental properties that non-human animal has. But we’ll mostly stick to human beings for purposes of this post. Another way in which the characterization given is imprecise is that there are several aspects of the mind philosophers have traditionally regarded as especially problematic. Jerry Fodor identifies three: consciousness, intentionality, and rationality. And the distinction between them entails a distinction between different types of zombie.
 
What the heck is this "directedness" that Feser talks about? He talks about "animality." He talks about "potency for the reception of form." What the heck is he talking about? Is this some kind of emergence, or is it something nonphysical?

"But given the nature of a dog (say) it is metaphysically impossible for prime matter to be informed by the substantial form of a dog while lacking qualia."

What? I guess I have to read this:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hylomorphism

~~ Paul
 
Oh I haven't gotten to that yet, though he brings it up in a lot of posts. It seems akin the animism Braude has suggested as a possibility. Kind of amusing since it seems to encourage more pagan and Eastern thinking instead of Feser's own Roman Catholic faith.

I figure people would find the other stuff of greater interest -> for example I'm working through Ross's Immaterial Aspects of Thought.
 
Then I don't understand the point of p-zombies. Feser seems to be saying that if p-zombies are deliberately made so that they don't accurately model human consciousness, this proves you can't model human consciousness through brain activity.

What is the point of making a p-zombie without the experience of pain?

Linda
 
When I first encountered p zombies, I thought they were supposed to be us. That is, I thought the difficulty would lie in distinguishing ourselves from a p zombie (which means the p zombie includes "thoughts and talk about consciousness). I see that with the Michael Graziano interview this idea is in play, where the p zombie's thoughts and talk about consciousness are the result of giving the p zombie a "theory of mind". Our consciousness then becomes a story we tell ourselves, after the fact, to rationalize our actions. We haven't ever demonstrated that our thoughts preceed our actions, right? I'm having trouble figuring out how we would be able to demonstrate this, though.

Linda
Would premeditated murder be one example of thought preceding action?
 
Then I don't understand the point of p-zombies. Feser seems to be saying that if p-zombies are deliberately made so that they don't accurately model human consciousness, this proves you can't model human consciousness through brain activity.
This brings up the issue of how we are to assume that the p-zombie is created. If the zombie world is a copy of the physical aspects of our world, then it depends on what we assume about our world. If it is a physicalist world, then the copy will be a complete copy and p-zombies seem to be inconceivable. If it is a dualist world, then the copy will leave behind the mental aspects, the zombies won't have consciousness, and it is difficult to conceive that they will behave the same as we do. If it is an idealist world, then the physical copy will be null.

So, I guess we are to assume that the p-zombie is created out of whole cloth. We then have to conceive that is has no consciousness yet is entirely indistinguishable from us. How is it made to give the right answers when asked about its inner experience? If consciousness is epiphenomenal, then it could give the right answers the same way we do. If consciousness is causal, then we have to rig up some physical hack to replace the consciousness and so the zombie is not indistinguishable.

Sounds like people who think the p-zombie is conceivable must be epiphenomenalists.

~~ Paul
 
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So, I guess we are to assume that the p-zombie is created out of whole cloth. We then have to conceive that is has no consciousness yet is entirely indistinguishable from us. How is it made to give the right answers when asked about its inner experience?

Wouldn't that just be akin to ELIZA?

Also, what do you mean by "right" answers in terms of its subjective experience?
 
Who thinks ELIZA is indistinguishable from a human? For example, it's a computer program.

~~ Paul

But it seems plausible that something like ELIZA could conceivably be built to imitate a being with conscious experiences.

Heck, any answers at all. I ask it if it thinks it's conscious and it says "yes." How?

Because it's evolved in such a way as to say "Yes" to that question?
 
But it seems plausible that something like ELIZA could conceivably be built to imitate a being with conscious experiences.



Because it's evolved in such a way as to say "Yes" to that question?

I thought for the zombie thought experiment everything has to be the same other than consciousness - so you can't just have a differently wired being for the thought experiment.
 
What the heck is this "directedness" that Feser talks about? He talks about "animality." He talks about "potency for the reception of form." What the heck is he talking about? Is this some kind of emergence, or is it something nonphysical?

"But given the nature of a dog (say) it is metaphysically impossible for prime matter to be informed by the substantial form of a dog while lacking qualia."

What? I guess I have to read this:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hylomorphism

~~ Paul
I wouldn't rely on Wiki to clarify anything. Today's academic philosophers tend to mischaracterize the arguments and issues of classical philosophy. Modern analytic philosophy has lost much of the nuance of more classical approaches. "Potency for the reception of form" makes perfect sense in Aristotelian metaphysics. Unfortunately neo-Scholasticism has developed in parallel with modern analytic philosophy. That parallel development makes it difficult to reconcile the two traditions. Despite this, Feser manages to do so fairly well and at the same time show the absurd dilemmas that atheistic naturalists create fro themselves because they are ignorant of historic solutions.
 
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