Mod+ Dualism & Transmission/Filter Theories [Resources]

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Sciborg_S_Patel

#1
Like other resources threads, idea here is mostly to provide material for people wishing to investigate the topic.

Some commentary/debate is useful but please, if such discussion seems to be getting long [over 3-5 posts] create a separate thread and link to continue.

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New Dualism Archive

This is a website devoted to the new study of different kinds of ontological dualism, in particular non-Cartesian dualism.

For some definitions of dualism, see the Definitions page.

At this site, dualism will be taken as the theory that two kinds (at least) of:
spacetime, events, particles, waves, fields, energies, minds, soul, spirit, divinity
have their own distinguishable substantial and enduring existence: their own ontology.
Generalised dualism (also called pluralism) is of particular interest, when more than two of the above have their own existence.

Here we do not mean necessarily independent existence, because many of the above list are clearly interrelated! Look, for example, at the interrelations between blue and green in the 'new dualism' logo at the top of the page. Blue and green are intertwined and contiguous at all scales. Similarly, a complete theory of dualism may well show how the dual substances are intertwined and contiguous at many levels.

The new aspect of new non-Cartesian dualism is the need to relate the dual substances in functional connections, as part of the science and philosophy of the whole: the whole nature, organism, person or world may have constituent dualities, but its parts are certainly not always disconnected!

By referring to distinguishable ontologies, we here do not refer to property dualism, whereby a single object or substance may have dual sets of properties not reducible to each other.
Similarly, we do not refer to the dualism of form and object, or information and matter, since we have known since Aristotle that forms are always forms of some object: distinguishable in our minds but never in reality.

This investigation will necesarily involve contributions from within physics, as well as input from psychology, spiritual psychology and theology. We want to invoke all the best knowledge of processes and structures from these disciplines, while avoiding reductionist tendencies to monisms.
 
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Sciborg_S_Patel

#2
Marcus Arvan on why he abandoned materialism for dualism

I know this is just a personal anecdote, but still, I think it is worth dwelling on for a moment. I started out my undergraduate career doing philosophy of mind at Tufts with Dan Dennett, one of the hardest-core physicalists out there. I was completely on board with him. Dualism had always seemed silly to me, and completely at odds with any scientifically respectable account of reality. And reading David Chalmers' book The Conscious Mind didn't sway me at all. The Zombie Argument -- the argument that Chalmers' entire book was based on -- immediately struck me then (just as it does now) as utterly question-begging. It seemed to me that will share Chalmers' intuition that zombies are conceivable, and so metaphysically possible, if one antecedently finds dualism attractive. Since I didn't find dualism attractive in the slightest, the Zombie Argument seemed silly to me.

Anyway, I more or less remained a physicalist...until I read Rosenberg's book.
Indeed, Rosenberg got me to fundamentally "see the world in a different way" -- a way in which the idea of there being intrinsic qualities (such as primitive consciousness and causation) just have to be a part of any remotely plausible metaphysical picture of reality. For here, essentially, is what the book got me to see. First, every substance or property (note: I think there is no coherent distinction between substances and properties) we would ordinarily call physical -- mass, charge, the weak and strong nuclear forces, books, motorcyles, whatever -- are all fundamentally relational, or structural, in nature. An electon just is defined in terms of a particular function. So is mass. So is charge. Etc. But -- and this is the second thing that Rosenberg's book got me to see -- you can't have relations without relata. There have to be intrinsic properties "behind" the relations we observe (as physical things) for there to be those relations in the first place.
So, anyway, it wasn't the detailed arguments of Rosenberg's book that got me. I suspect some (or even much) of his own theory of causation, and how consciousness emerges from large-scale causal nexus in the brain, is false. Be that as it may, Rosenberg got me to thinking, for the very first time -- on broadly Kantian grounds, but also simply focusing on the phenomena of consciousness, causation, and structure -- that any world at all (let alone ours) just has to be dualistic in nature: at least in the sense of there being (A) "physical"/structural properties that can be measured by science, and (B) intrinsic/non-structural properties which cannot.
 
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Sciborg_S_Patel

#3
Myers/James Filter Theory and Contemporary Science: Toward Reconciliation

The common feature of these metaphors, and the root of their conceptual problems, is the idea of passage through the filter. There is a way around this, however. Recall that the central goal of James’s original analysis was to show that even perfect correlation between brain events and mental events entails neither the impossibility of post-mortem survival nor the truth of the conventional materialist production theory of brain-mind relations. Those views derive from interpreting the admitted facts of functional dependence—mind-brain correlations—in one particular way. Other possibilities exist, however: “When we think of the law that thought is a function of the brain, we are not required to think of productive function only; we are entitled also to consider permissive or transmissive function. And this the ordinary psychophysiologist leaves out of his account” (James, 1898/1900, p. 15).

Most subsequent advocates of James’s analysis, as we have seen, have invoked its “transmission” thread, so much so that the whole picture is now widely known by that name alone. We think this unfortunate, because it is actually the other thread—permission—that is theoretically the more promising. More generally, we wish now to argue that by thinking of the brain as an organ which somehow constrains, regulates, restricts, limits, and enables or permits expression of the mind in its full generality, we can obtain an account of mind-brain relations which potentially reconciles Myers’s theory of the Subliminal Self with the observed correlations between mind and brain, while circumventing the conceptual difficulties identified above in transmission models. We in fact see a spectrum of potentially viable theoretical possibilities of this sort. We will next canvas these under two broad headings—non-Cartesian dualist-interactionist models and neutral-monist models—that seem to us to bracket the range.
 
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Sciborg_S_Patel

#4
Giving Dualism Its Due

I have been a materialist about the mind for forty years, since first I considered the mind-body issue. In all that time I have seen exactly one argument for mind-body dualism that I thought even prima facie convincing.<1>. And like many other materialists, I have often quickly cited standard objections to dualism that are widely taken to be fatal<2>—notoriously the dread Interaction Problem. My materialism has never wavered. Nor is it about to waver now; I cannot take dualism very seriously.

Being a philosopher, of course I would like to think that my stance is rational, held not just instinctively and scientistically and in the mainstream but because the arguments do indeed favor materialism over dualism. But I do not think that, though I used to. My position may be rational, broadly speaking, but not because the arguments favor it: Though the arguments for dualism do (indeed) fail, so do the arguments for materialism. And the standard objections to dualism are not very convincing; if one really manages to be a dualist in the first place, one should not be much impressed by them. My purpose in this paper is to hold my own feet to the fire and admit that I do not proportion my belief to the evidence.<3>
 
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Sciborg_S_Patel

#5
Review of Meixner: The Two Sides of Being – A Reassessment of Psycho-Physical Dualism (Part 1)

A defense of psycho-physical dualism — especially one as comprehensive, rigorous, passionate, and well written as The Two Sides of Being — is bound to be hugely unpopular with large parts of the contemporary philosophical community. The author of this important philosophical work is Uwe Meixner, who teaches philosophy at the University of Regensburg. There are two thrusts to his defense of dualism....
Review of Meixner: The Two Sides of Being – A Reassessment of Psycho-Physical Dualism (Part 2)

Psycho-physical dualism may not be the last word in ontology, but if there is a last word, the surest route to it is likely to pass through a dualistic theory of consciousness. One needs to discover both the ultimate subject and the ultimate object — the former by deep introspection and/or mystical experience, the latter by following the physical evidence — before one is in a position to recognize their original identity and arrive at a genuine (i.e., non-reductive) monism.

In my estimation, Uwe Meixner’s theory of consciousness is not only the most convincing dualistic theory of consciousness to date. The Two Sides of Being is also one of the most important works coming out of academic philosophy for quite some time.
 
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Sciborg_S_Patel

#6
Feser's Mind-Body posts.

Going to quote the ones he specifically sets as being about dualism:

Much of what contemporary materialist philosophers have to say in criticism of dualism rests on egregious distortions and/or ignorance of what dualist philosophers have actually said. A good example of this tendency is provided by the work of Paul Churchland, as I have demonstrated at length in a series of posts:

“Churchland on dualism, Part I”

“Churchland on dualism, Part II”

“Churchland on dualism, Part III”

“Churchland on dualism, Part IV”

Churchland on dualism, Part V
Note I also mentioned the above critique in the Questionable Tactics by Skeptics thread.

 
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Sciborg_S_Patel

#7
A Simple Proof of Mind-Body Dualism

This paper provides an elegant proof of mind-body dualism. I show, first, that all properties known to humankind, aside from qualitative properties of consciousness (and perhaps numerical properties), are fundamentally relational in nature. I then show that relational properties are, at least in principle, always fully describable in language. Finally, I point out that qualitative properties of consciousness are clearly not fully describable in ordinary language. Thus, qualitative properties of consciousness are fundamentally different than all other properties known to humankind: they are fundamentally intrinsic properties that stand outside of the realm of scientific inquiry.
 
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Sciborg_S_Patel

#8
A New Theory of Free Will

This paper shows that the conjunction of several live philosophical and scientific hypotheses – including the holographic principle and multiverse theory in quantum physics, and eternalism and mind-body dualism in philosophy – jointly imply an audacious new theory of free will. This new theory, "Libertarian Compatibilism", holds that the physical world is an eternally existing array of two-dimensional information – a vast number of possible pasts, presents, and futures – and the mind a nonphysical entity or set of properties that "read" that physical information off to subjective conscious awareness (in much the same way that a song written on an ordinary compact-disc is only played when read by an outside medium, i.e. a CD-player). According to this theory, every possible physical “timeline” in the multiverse may be fully physically deterministic or physically-causally closed but each person’s consciousness still entirely free to choose, ex nihilo, outside of the physical order, which physically-closed timeline is experienced by conscious observers.

Although Libertarian Compatibilism is admittedly fantastic, I show that it not only follows from several live scientific and philosophical hypotheses, I also show that it (A) is a far more explanatorily powerful model of quantum mechanics than more traditional interpretations (e.g. the Copenhagen, Everett, and Bohmian interpretations), (B) makes determinate, testable empirical predictions in quantum theory, and finally, (C) predicts and explains the very existence of a number of philosophical debates and positions in the philosophy of mind, time, personal identity, and free will. First, I show that whereas traditional interpretations of quantum mechanics are all philosophically problematic and roughly as ontologically “extravagant” as Libertarian Compatibilism – in that they all posit “unseen” processes – Libertarian Compatibilism is nearly identical in structure to the only working simulation that human beings have ever constructed capable of reproducing (and so explaining) every general feature of quantum mechanics we perceive: namely, massive-multiplayer-online-roleplaying videogames (or MMORPGs). Although I am not the first to suggest that our world is akin to a computer simulation, I show that existing MMORPGs (online simulations we have already created) actually reproduce every general feature of quantum mechanics within their simulated-world reference-frames. Second, I show that existing MMORPGs also replicate (and so explain) many philosophical problems we face in the philosophy of mind, time, personal identity, and free will – all while conforming to the Libertarian Compatibilist model of reality. I conclude, as such, that as fantastic and metaphysically extravagant as Libertarian Compatibilism may initially seem, it may well be true. It explains a number of features of our reality that no other physical or metaphysical theory does
 
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Sciborg_S_Patel

#9
How Cartesian Dualism Might Have Been True

David J. Chalmers (January, 1990)

We could have been characters in a huge computer simulation. It is a familiar idea that the whole world might be simulated on a computer, and things would seem exactly the same to us (and indeed, who is to say that we are not).

I imagine, though, a different sort of simulation, of the kind common in the fields of artificial intelligence and artifiicial life, where we have (1) a simulated environment and (2) simulated beings which are "moving" through this environment, according to a program that models these beings' thought processes and their decisions. Imagine a very complex project like this (like the vivarium, say), perhaps with genetic algorithms which get more and more complex and sophisticated, until eventually very sophisticated, rational beings evolve.

When they speculate about the world, they will find that the environment possess certain regularities, and this will lead them to laws of "physics" about their external world. This will lead them to speculate about whether they too, at the bottom line, are subject to the same laws. This might seem plausible...but of course it will not be the case! Their "mental" life obeys a completely different set of laws, and further these laws are off limits for direct observation. Their mental life takes place not within their world at all, but within in a computer in a compltely different universe! When it comes to observing the "laws" of their behaviour, they will reach some dead end in looking for causal mechanisms. Unlike our world, such mechanisms are simply not "locally supported" by simple physical laws. I'm not quite sure what would happen next.

If they tried to "look inside their heads" (assuming they have at least vaguely coherent senses)... They'd just find an empty box. They'd ask "how can I do all this complex processing". The answer would have to be, well, I'm just kind of non-material mind. Of course, there would be a breakdown in the usual kind of physical causation around the "heads" of such a being, unlike our world.

Moral: Cartesian Dualism isn't quite so outlandish and conceptually problematic as tends to be supposed.

For a non-Cartesian form of dualism see my Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness.
 
#10
Like other resources threads, idea here is mostly to provide material for people wishing to investigate the topic.

Some commentary/debate is useful but please, if such discussion seems to be getting long [over 3-5 posts] create a separate thread and link to continue.

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New Dualism Archive
Administrative detail:
I am the person who maintains the New Dualism Archive.
If you know of more material to include, please let me know.
 
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Sciborg_S_Patel

#11
Administrative detail:
I am the person who maintains the New Dualism Archive.
If you know of more material to include, please let me know.
Ian! Excited to see you're still around. Do you want me to included this note in the OP?

I've been following Marcus Avan's ideas on his Peer to Peer Hypothesis, as a dualist theory if you haven't included him his papers might make a good addition?
 
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Sciborg_S_Patel

#12
The Brain as Filter: On Removing the Stuffing from the Keyhole

In his book The Doors of Perception, which helped galvanize the counterculture of the 1960s, novelist Aldous Huxley wrote, “[E]ach one of us is potentially Mind at Large. But in so far as we are animals, our business at all costs is to survive. To make biological survival possible, Mind at Large has to be funneled through the reducing valve of the brain and nervous system. What comes out at the other end is a measly trickle of the kind of consciousness which will help us to stay alive on the surface of this particular planet.”3

Huxley, like Henri Bergson, Ferdinand Schiller, William James, and others before him, believed the brain functions as a filter, normally shutting out perceptions, memories, and thoughts that are not necessary for the survival and reproduction of the organism. Rather than producing consciousness, these observers believed the brain largely eliminates it, diminishing what consciousness is capable of revealing to us. As astrophysicist David Darling says in his book Soul Search, we are conscious not because of the brain, but despite it.4

Frederic W. H. Myers (1843-1901), the British classical scholar, poet, and philosopher, advanced a sophisticated filter theory of brain function that was endorsed by his friend and colleague William James, the Harvard physician and psychologist who is widely considered the founder of American psychology. James, with his superb capacity for metaphor, suggested that the brain acts as a lens or prism that filters, reduces, redirects, or otherwise alters incoming light in a systematic fashion.5 But James didn't consider lenses or prisms as the ultimate metaphor for the brain. As University of Virginia psychologist and consciousness researcher Edward F. Kelly states in his analysis of Myers' views, “Subsequent advocates of transmission or filter models have tended naturally to update this basic picture with reference to emerging technologies such as radio and television” that serve as the filter instead of lenses or prisms.6
 
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Sciborg_S_Patel

#13
Quantum Interactive Dualism: An Alternative to Materialism

René Descartes proposed an interactive dualism that posits an interaction between the mind of a human being and some of the matter located in his or her brain. Isaac Newton subsequently formulated a physical theory based exclusively on the material/physical part of Descartes’ ontology. Newton’s theory enforced the principle of the causal closure of the physical, and the classical physics that grew out of it enforces this same principle. This classical theory purports to give, in principle, a complete deterministic account of the physically described properties of nature, expressed exclusively in terms of these physically described properties themselves. Orthodox contemporary physical theory violates this principle in two separate ways. First, it injects random elements into the dynamics. Second, it allows, and also requires, abrupt probing actions that disrupt the mechanistically described evolution of the physically described systems. These probing actions are called Process 1 interventions by von Neumann. They are psycho-physical events. Neither the content nor the timing of these events is determined either by any known law, or by the afore-mentioned random elements. Orthodox quantum mechanics considers these events to be instigated by choices made by conscious agents. In von Neumann’s formulation of quantum theory each such intervention acts upon the state of the brain of some conscious agent. Thus orthodox von Neumann contemporary physics posits an interactive dualism similar to that of Descartes. But in this quantum version the effects of the conscious choices upon our brains are controlled, in part, by the known basic rules of quantum physics. This theoretically specified mind-brain connection allows many basic psychological and neuropsychological findings associated with the apparent physical effectiveness of our conscious volitional efforts to be explained in a causal and practically useful way. The intent of this paper is to give an updated account of the author’s developing theory that is clearer than before, focused on the positive, and suitable for non-specialist readers.
Quantum Interactive Dualism: The Libet and Einstein-PodolskyRosen Causal Anomalies

Abstract: Replacing faulty nineteenth century physics by its orthodox quantum successor converts the earlier materialist conception of nature to a structure that does not enforce the principle of the causal closure of the physical. The quantum laws possess causal gaps, and these gaps are filled in actual scientific practice by inputs from our streams of consciousness. The form of the quantum laws permits and suggests the existence of an underlying reality that is built not on substances, but on psychophysical events, and on objective tendencies for these events to occur. These events constitute intrinsic mind-brain connections. They are fundamental links between brain processes described in physical terms and events in our streams of consciousness. This quantum ontology confers upon our conscious intentions the causal efficacy assigned to them in actual scientific practice, and creates a substancefree interactive dualism. This putative quantum ontology has previously been shown to have impressive explanatory power in both psychology and neuroscience. Here it is used to reconcile the existence of physically efficacious conscious free will with causal anomalies of both the Libet and Einstein-Rosen-Podolsky types.
Note there's a section at New Dualism on this topic:

@Ian Thompson - Do you think the conclusion still holds?

Quantum Physics & Dualism:

Conclusion

Quantum Physics may be indeterministic about the detailed choices between differerent outcomes for some classes of microscopic events, namely decoherent measurements, but it is not completely arbitary. Rather, it makes very precise predictions for the probabilities of those outcomes, and, furthermore, the evolution of these probability distributions is completely deterministic.

Either dualist input influences the choice of when decohering measurements occur (as Stapp suggests), or it changes the probabiliities of different outcomes (as Saunders et al also consider). In the first case, the range of influence is extremely limited, and hardly plausible in a dualist theory. In the second case, the dualist input change the probability rules of quantum physics, in just the same way as dualist input would have to change Newton's laws of motion if it were to influence classical systems.

We conclude therefore, with Saunders and Brecha, that it is very doubtful that any dualist or divine input into the operation of the natural world proceeds by exploiting the small residual indeterminism of quantum physics. Dualist control in quantum physics is no easier than in classical physics. That is, any influence of a dual degree must affect those properties of objects that are also measured by physics.

The challenge, therefore, is to find a coherent theory which explains what, how, when and why those physical properties are changed.
 
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Sciborg_S_Patel

#14
The Physics of Interactionism

Physics has been invoked both to refute and to support psycho-physical interactionism, the view that mind and matter are two mutually irreducible, interacting domains. Thus it has been held against interactionism that it implies violations of the laws of physics, notably the law of energy conservation. I examine the meaning of conservation laws in physics and show that in fact no valid argument against the interactionist theory can be drawn from them. In defence of interactionism it has been argued that mind can act on matter through an apparent loophole in physical determinism, without violating physical laws. I show that this argument is equally fallacious. This leads to the conclusion that the indeterminism of quantum mechanics cannot be the physical correlate of free will; if there is a causally efficacious non-material mind, then the behaviour of matter cannot be fully governed by physical laws. I show that the best (if not the only) way of formulating departures from the ‘normal’, physically determined behaviour of matter is in terms of modifications of the electromagnetic interactions between particles. I also show that mental states and events are non-spatial, and that departures from the ‘normal’ behaviour of matter, when caused by mental events, are not amenable to mathematical description.
This made me think of McFadden's theory of consciousness.
 
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Sciborg_S_Patel

#15
Does Consciousness Depend on the Brain?

James then raises an objection to the transmissive theory of the body-mind relationship: yes, the transmission hypothesis may be a logical possibility, but isn't it just unbridled speculation? Isn't the production hypothesis simpler? Is it not more rigorously scientific to take the relationship between brain and mind to be one of production, not transmission?

But as James points out, from the standpoint of strictly empirical science, these objections carry no weight whatsoever. Strictly speaking, the most we can ever observe is concomitant variation between states of the brain and states of mind — when brain activity changes in a certain way, then consciousness changes also. The hypothesis of production, or of transmission, is something that we add to the observations of concomitant variation in order to account for it. A scientist never observes states of the brain producing states of consciousness. Indeed, it is not even clear what we could possibly mean by observing such production.

And as for the objection that the transmission hypothesis is somehow fantastic, exactly the same objection can be raised against the production theory. In the case of the production of steam by a kettle we have an easily understood model — of alterations of molecular motion — because the components that change are physically homogenous with each other.

But part of the reason the mind-body relationship has seemed so puzzling for so long is because mental and physical events seem so completely unlike each other. This radical difference in their natures makes it exceedingly difficult to conceptualize the relationship between the two in terms of anything of which we are familiar. It is partly for this reason that even though it has been more than a century since James delivered his lecture, in all that time neither psychology nor physiology has been able to produce any intelligible model of how biochemical processes could possibly be transformed into conscious experience.

It has been pointed out many times that there is no logical requirement that only "like can cause like" — or in other words, that only things of a similar nature can affect each other. But this consideration has not removed the mystery from the mind-body relationship. As James
wrote, the production of consciousness by the brain, if it does in fact occur, is "as far as our understanding goes, as great a miracle as if we said, thought is 'spontaneously generated,' or 'created out of nothing.'"
 
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#16
Yes, that is my conclusion still.
We do not yet have a theory that actually predicts how deliberate mental actions have effects on the physical world, even if that world is one governed by quantum physics. Frankly, I think people respect quantum physics too much and are unwilling to change it for new circumstances such as where minds are acting. So far, it has never been tested in that domain: only assumed that it still holds unchanged.
 
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Sciborg_S_Patel

#17
Quantum Interactive Dualism: From Beck And Eccles Tunneling Model Of Exocytosis To Molecular Biology Of Snare Zipping

We commence this review by outlining the challenges faced by physical theories of consciousness and briefly describe the two main approaches based on classical or quantum mechanics. Next, we provide a detailed exposition of the motivation, the theoretical construction and experimental falsification of the celebrated model due to Beck and Eccles concerning mind-brain interaction purported to operate at the sites of neurotransmitter release in the brain. Finally, we propose our own model of a vibrationally assisted quantum tunneling mechanism involving a Davydov soliton propagating along the hydrogen bonds in the protein four-α- helix bundle of the SNARE complex (soluble NSF attachment protein receptor; NSF, N-ethylmaleimide sensitive fusion proteins) that drives synaptic vesicle fusion. We also discuss the possible experimental tests that could falsify our model. Since erasure of consciousness by volatile anesthetics results from binding to the hydrophobic core of the SNARE four-α-helix bundle, our model is well suited to support quantum interactive dualism.
 
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Sciborg_S_Patel

#18
Thinking Outside the Box: The Essence and Implications of Quantum Entanglement and the Story of Spin-mediated Consciousness Theory

What do we mean by pre-spacetime? Pre-spacetime in this article means a non-spatial and non-temporal domain but it is not associated with an extra-dimension in the usual sense since there is no distance or time in such domain (See, Hu & Wu, 2002). We have argued before that in a dualistic approach mind resides in this domain and unpaired nuclear and/or electronic spins are its mind-pixels (id.). So pre-spacetime is a holistic domain located outside spacetime but connected through quantum thread/channel to everywhere in spacetime enabling quantum entanglement or Einstein’s “spooky action at a distance.” Aerts (2004), Clarke (2004) and others have also expressed the non-space view of quantum nonlocality.

Such a non-spatial and non-temporal pre-spacetime is a “world” beyond Einstein’s relativistic world but does not contradict with the latter since the latter deals with classical physical events occurring within spacetime. In contrast, quantum entanglement occurs within non-spatial and non-temporal domain. Therefore, instantaneous signaling through quantum entanglement in pre-spacetime is possible if the entangled quantum entities can directly sense and/or utilize the entanglement.
From 2006, so probably changed now:

Hupin Hu is the chief investigator of the spin-mediated consciousness theory. He is currently an attorney in private practice and the Chief Scientist of Biophysics Consulting Group. For more than six years he was also a proprietary equity trader at a Wall Street firm. He obtained his B.S. and M.S. in China in 1983 and 1986 respectively, Ph.D. from University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana in 1991 and J.D. from New York Law School in 1998.

Maoxin Wu is Hu’s collaborator, supporter and spouse of almost 20 years. She is currently an assistant professor at Mount Sinai School of Medicine and Director of Fine Needle Aspiration Services at the Department of Pathology, Mount Sinai Medical Center. She is a board-certified pathologist and received her medical residency training at Long Island Jewish Medical Center during 1996-1999 and was a fellow of cytopathology at said Center during 1999-2000. She received her M.D. from Shanxi Medical University, China, in 1984 and M.S. and Ph.D. from University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana in 1990 and 1995 respectively
 
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Sciborg_S_Patel

#19
Thanks to Jim_Smith for posting this on his site:

A scientific case for conceptual dualism: The problem of consciousness and the opposing domains hypothesis.


In recent years, a number of scientists and philosophers have suggested that the psychological and neural sciences provide support for, and are committed to, reductive physicalism – the view that all aspects of the mental are best explained by the physical processes of the brain. Here I suggest a different view. Emerging research in neuroscience and psychology suggests a dualism in human understanding. Our capacity for understanding physical processes appears to be in fundamental tension with our capacity for thinking about the inner mental states of others. In this essay, I first review evidence for a divide in our neural structure which maps onto thinking about minds versus thinking about the mechanical properties of bodies. This divide is intriguing; however it falls short of actually explaining why we perceive difficulties for integrating these two types of understanding. I then introduce a bold hypothesis – that our neural structure constrains our thinking in a way that limits our ability to integrate these two types of understanding. This hypothesis was generated to explain one perceived problem, the apparent existence of an explanatory gap, and makes novel and falsifiable predictions. I then review behavioral and neuroscientific evidence which confirms these predictions and extends the model to address other related issues, including motivational factors associated with belief in ontological dualism. By demonstrating that this theoretical framework yields testable predictions, these findings lend support to the bold hypothesis. I conclude by exploring some theoretical and practical implications of the hypothesized dualism in human understanding.
 
#20
This is so extraordinary. how does it take so long for someone to see that there has to be qualities underlying quantities - this is hawking's old question, what puts the "fire" into "our" equations.

I think Iain McGilchrist explains it quite well - we have become a left brained civilization, deluded into taking our abstractions for realities. It's so extraordinarily simple, once you see it, it's so difficult to imagine how anyone could ever have believed in self existent matter, or laws of nature, or electrical impulses producing phenomenal experience.
 
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