Materialism/Physicalism is incompatible with our ability to reason

Brain processes are like any other physical processes e.g the Earth orbiting the Sun. Physical processes are immutable. But our thoughts have a freedom and can chop and change with our will, as well as our overt behaviour. If our thoughts were like the Earth orbiting the sun, then our thoughts would lack this freedom. But as I explain in my essays, this is incoherent.
And yet no matter how hard you try you'll react to situations in predictable ways. And yet will surfing the web advertisers can send user specific advertisements to the site you may be using such as Facebook. I'm saying you ain't as immutable and free wheeling as you believe yourself to be, no one is. And contrary to the conclusion you've argue yourself into thoughts and brain processes are one and the same.
 
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I'm not sure why this conversation is going off on a tangent. I'm wondering if there's anything wrong with the argument as I outline it on my blog.
 
And yet no matter how hard you try you'll react to situations in predictable ways. And yet will surfing the web advertisers can send user specific advertisements to the site you may be using such as Facebook. I'm saying you ain't as immutable and free wheeling as you believe yourself to be, no one is. And contrary to the conclusion you've argue yourself into thoughts and brain processes are one and the same.

It doesn't matter if my behaviour is predictable. Even if my behaviour is entirely predictable. You can even draw up laws -- eg on spotting a £10 note on the pavement, Ian will stoop down and pick it up and stuff it in his pocket.

But an essential notion of materialism is causal closure. I cannot do whatever I want; my behaviour (under materialism) is constrained along certain channels so that causal closure ain't violated. But my voluntary behaviour isn't constrained. Nothing makes me pick up the £10 note, even though I inevitably will.

PS Use FBP for facebook, you can block adverts.
 
Actually, I've just come to a realisation. This whole misunderstanding arises because materialists conflate the inevitability of specific behaviour under physical laws with the inevitability of specific behaviour due to the fact people will invariably behave the same way under specific circumstances.
 
Well, at this point I'd be simply repeating myself! I certainly won't convince any materialists with my essay. I never am able to convince them of anything which challenges their materialism.
Don't worry, they have no free will, it's not their fault ;):D
 
I'm not sure why this conversation is going off on a tangent. I'm wondering if there's anything wrong with the argument as I outline it on my blog.
We already told you. If we are to assume that reasoning = brain processes, then your statement in the last paragraph is incorrect.

"But it then follows that reasoning something through is causally irrelevant."

If you won't at least clarify your post, then you simply do not care about critique.

~~ Paul
 
But an essential notion of materialism is causal closure. I cannot do whatever I want; my behaviour (under materialism) is constrained along certain channels so that causal closure ain't violated. But my voluntary behaviour isn't constrained.
You do not know this. Isn't it obvious that this is a just-so claim? Show us a proof.

And as soon as you throw in randomness, this entire argument is pointless. You might not do the same thing under identical circumstances.

~~ Paul
 
Actually, I've just come to a realisation. This whole misunderstanding arises because materialists conflate the inevitability of specific behaviour under physical laws with the inevitability of specific behaviour due to the fact people will invariably behave the same way under specific circumstances.
Good point...
Also maybe someone like Bill Gates would pick up the £10 note from the pavemente and light a cigar with it :D... or give it to someone else, or tell someone else on the street to pick it up :). I am not sure any behavior is truly "inevitable". Certainly there are specific constraints that can make them as such, but I am not sure this can prove that we inevitably behave the same in *every* circumstance. It seems we don't.
 
Actually, I've just come to a realisation. This whole misunderstanding arises because materialists conflate the inevitability of specific behaviour under physical laws with the inevitability of specific behaviour due to the fact people will invariably behave the same way under specific circumstances.
No, that isn't the problem. I don't believe that people will invariably behave the same way, because
  • There are never two identical circumstances.
  • Even if there were, there is randomness.

~~ Paul
 
We already told you. If we are to assume that reasoning = brain processes, then your statement in the last paragraph is incorrect.

"But it then follows that reasoning something through is causally irrelevant."

If you won't at least clarify your post, then you simply do not care about critique.

~~ Paul


But reasoning can't equal brain processes since brain processes are dictated by impersonal physical laws, and reasons, or any chain of thought, or any voluntary behaviour, is not.
 
You do not know this. Isn't it obvious that this is a just-so claim? Show us a proof.

And as soon as you throw in randomness, this entire argument is pointless. You might not do the same thing under identical circumstances.

~~ Paul

Causal closure means I can't just do anything, but must follow a prescribed path. Just like the Earth does as it orbits the Sun.

But at any moment in time I have the capacity to act in numerous ways. Seemingly unlike the moon as it orbits the Earth.

And we have to have such freedom in order to reason. My thoughts must be directed by my understanding rather than physical laws that are non-teleological etc.
 
But reasoning can't equal brain processes since brain processes are dictated by impersonal physical laws, and reasons, or any chain of thought, or any voluntary behaviour, is not.
Then your entire post is a non sequitur. You say:

"If a train of thought is literally identical to some physical processes, and these physical processes have causal powers, then it necessarily follows that the train of thought itself has causal powers too."
AND
"Now, of course, the materialist claims that “A” is identical to “a”, “B” is identical to “B” etc."

The rest of your post is predicated on that assumption. If it is not, then you should make it clear in the post where you've stopped making the assumption.

Meanwhile, the bolded statement above is a just-so assertion.

~~ Paul
 
Causal closure means I can't just do anything, but must follow a prescribed path. Just like the Earth does as it orbits the Sun.

But at any moment in time I have the capacity to act in numerous ways. Seemingly unlike the moon as it orbits the Earth.
This is an unproven assertion.

~~ Paul
 
Yet you can conceive of a (coherent) way that they impact on "the physical"?
One can easily give examples of how thoughts (or emotions) impact the physical, but then it can be argued that thoughts themselves arise from the physical and are purely brain generated. The question to ask is if "the physical" (electrochemical brain processes) can account for all observed, reported and studied experiences, including normal waking consciousness, psychic phenomena, apparitions, veridical NDEs, verified reincarnation memories (including phobias, birthmarks and defects), etc.

Cheers,
Bill
 
One can easily give examples of how thoughts (or emotions) impact the physical, but then it can be argued that thoughts themselves arise from the physical and are purely brain generated. The question to ask is if "the physical" (electrochemical brain processes) can account for all observed, reported and studied experiences, including normal waking consciousness, psychic phenomena, apparitions, veridical NDEs, verified reincarnation memories (including phobias, birthmarks and defects), etc.
I suspect that malf was asking how an immaterial thought can impact the physical.

Your question is spot on. And that is why metaphysics is unlikely to give us an answer. It's an empirical question.

~~ Paul
 
Yet you can conceive of a (coherent) way that they impact on "the physical"?

How could it conceivably be incoherent? Anyway, regardless of whether it is coherent or not, we know it happens. I think and my physical body speaks or types.
 
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