New Book From Dennett...

Perhaps it's worth remembering that in the entirety of biology, the building blocks appear to be nothing other than the 'physical' (atoms, molecules etc.)
Yikes!

Yes - I know the idea that the universe we inhabit has measurements other than physics/chemistry is not main-stream dogma, but just look at the subject matter of D. Dennett's book to find where we are in the new paradigm. Dennett is relying on affordances and memes as a basis for his arguments. These are building blocks of structured information and not of forces and mass.

John Von Neumann told us that communication theory, logic and thermodynamics form an identity (a unified LoA), as we understand the structure of functional events. These 3 (and many more informational measures) are at a different level of abstraction (LoA) for assessment of functional processes; than are chemistry and physics. They describe how experiencing and organizing environments can be measured! These principles are the tools of living things with which to bring to bear useful behaviors in responding to their environments.

Science can model the chemistry of DNA/RNA/Ribosome reactions and not get at how they function to enforce the logic of health, sexual reproduction, food-gathering and bio-communication in the least. These essential processes are measured by bits, future planning and feedback.
 
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One can google and find refutations of any metaphysic proposed. I'm not really sure it gets us anywhere?

Well this argument has been had on this board over and over. For me it's better to just post these papers for people who haven't read them.

We know "skeptics" will defend materialism forever, since it aligns best with their anti-religion goals (Sam Harris being one of the few exceptions who's honest enough to recognize materialism is nonsensical- Part One & Part Two for new readers).

I mean I've even responded to Massimo's argument before, I can find the post and repaste the argument if need be?
 
Never knew Harris thought materialism is non sensical interesting

It's a pity how he doesn't see how, if consciousness is fundamental, a lot of his ideas (no free will, no God, existence of natural laws in any possible reality) get thrown into question.
 
My previous reply to Massimo's argument:

http://www.skeptiko-forum.com/threa...-non-organic-sentience.2970/page-2#post-83427

Personally I think many materialist philosophers are more motivated by an anti-theist sentiment than the desire to really consider the problem of materialist explanations. We've seen philosophers mention this issue in the past:

"I believe one of the unstated assumptions behind the current batch of views is that they represent the only scientifically acceptable alternatives to the antiscientism that went with traditional dualism, the belief in the immortality of the soul, spiritualism, and so on. Acceptance of the current views is motivated not so much by an independent conviction of their truth as by a terror of what are apparently the only alternatives."
-John Searle, "What's wrong with the philosophy of mind?"

"A motivation to avoid dualism, for many, has arisen from various spiritualistic, religious, supernatural and other antiscientific overtones of the view. But those are quite inessential. A naturalistic dualism expands our view of the world, but it does not invoke the forces of darkness."
-David Chalmers, "The Conscious Mind"

I can see a rejection of dualism without an acceptance of materialism, though I don't think dualism necessarily invokes the Interaction Problem - see Dualism & Transmitter/Filter Resources thread. Materialism, as commonly defined to include some kind of natural laws binding nature, also has the Interaction Problem - where are these Laws and how can they interact with matter to ensure paranormal phenomenon are impossible?
 
Closer to Truth: How Much More to Physical Reality?
Mainstream science and mainstream western analytic philosophy, for the most part, have limited the fundamentals to physicality. I offer that mainstream philosophy is beginning to embrace informational realism - where information is added to the list of "real things" with matter and energy. (K. Sayre 1976 and L. Floridi 2003).


I am all wound-up having just read parts of Dan Dennett's brand new summary publication on mind. In it, Dennett cites almost all of the authors and themes I have been ranting about on this forum. Floridi has two listings in the index of From Bacteria to Bach and there is large reliance of the concept of affordance, with citation to J.J. Gibson! Dennett is a Barwise Prize winner and I look forward to his up-to-date assessment of the current counter-arguments to his stances.


In footnote #29, Dennett feels he has to paraphrase and then deny the Gibsonian fundamental insight - while including the computable part of Gibson's theory as supporting his own constructed worldview. Dennett declares: "The slogan of radical Gibsonians says it all: ""It's not what is in your head; it's what your head is in(to)."" I am not endorsing this view."


As someone who is sure that mental activity changes real world probabilities directly, Dennett is stuck with the tools of information science being his go-to defense - yet doesn't embrace the ontological reality behind their activity. Once information is treated as ontologically real and able to be processed by minds in a unique way - materialism is over. (Re-posted from another thread)
 
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Not really my claim, but Piglucci's... and I can't put it any better than in his video above.
If the video is the best way to put it then we're in a lot of trouble... :D
It's very easy to demonstrate that colors and triangles are not the same categories... but he offers no argument about Chalmer's categories ;)

Chalmer's formalization (easy/hard problem) on the other hand is logically sound and highlights the fundamental shortcomings of describing experience with bits of matter... This is indeed a glaring category issue, as there's not even a theoretical principle to support it!

See, the main problem here is claiming "unwarranted profundity" by appealing to category issues, which is essentially handwaving with a touch of Maslow's hammer.
He's not really offering any cogent argument other than ... "We'll solve this with biology and neuroscience, and it makes no sense to discuss it outside of that context..."

He's essentially "thinking inside the box", posting promissory notes with Maslow's printer :D
 
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If the video is the best way to put it then we're in a lot of trouble... :D
It's very easy to demonstrate that colors and triangles are not the same categories... but he offers no argument about Chalmer's categories ;)

He says clearly that 'the experience' and 'the explanation of the experience' are in different categories. It is therefore a category error to appeal to the experience to come to any position on its origin/explanation. This is clearly what Chalmers is doing in formulating his position. Incidentally, I don't think this is necessarily an argument for mind=brain, but an argument against "the hard problem" and similar approaches.

Chalmer's formalization (easy/hard problem) on the other hand is logically sound and highlights the fundamental shortcomings of describing experience with bits of matter...

See above. Piglucci might challenge the soundness of the logic.

This is indeed a glaring category issue, as there's not even a theoretical principle to support it!

The evolutionary development of biological sensory systems?

See, the main problem here is claiming "unwarranted profundity" by appealing to category issues, which is essentially handwaving with a touch of Maslow's hammer.
He's not really offering any cogent argument other than ... "We'll solve this with biology and neuroscience, and it makes no sense to discuss it outside of that context..."

He's essentially "thinking inside the box", posting promissory notes with Maslow's printer :D

Whether he's right or wrong, I think the argument is cleverer and more subtle than that. I can see it might require some to set aside their ingrained assumptions about "consciousness".
 
He says clearly that 'the experience' and 'the explanation of the experience' are in different categories.
Oh yes he says it clearly... but he doesn't offer a real argument as to why that would be the case. Do we need to take it on faith?

Whether he's right or wrong, I think the argument is cleverer and more subtle than that.
Can you explain why whitout going in circles? (i.e. referring to the video, which in fact explains nothing...)

Thanks
 
Oh yes he says it clearly... but he doesn't offer a real argument as to why that would be the case. Do we need to take it on faith?

I think one just needs to reflect on it. Are you insisting that 'the experience' and 'the explanation of the experience' are in the same category? Where is the argument for that? Do we need to take it on faith? There may be a trap in that thinking into which Chalmers (and others) have fallen.

Can you explain why whitout going in circles? (i.e. referring to the video, which in fact explains nothing...)

Well, it encourages some open minded reflection and doesn't place arbitrary restrictions on what 'the physical' can achieve. I've also noticed in the last page or so that it is difficult to argue against without falling into the trap it sets. ;)
 
I think one just needs to reflect on it. Are you insisting that 'the experience' and 'the explanation of the experience' are in the same category?
Let's see... are "combustion" and a "the explanation" of combustion two different things? Well, yes!
So is consciousness and the explanation of consciousness. Or experience and the expanation of experience... and so what?

Isn't the explanation of combustion a complete description of the phenomenon? If it is then we have a full description of combustion. If not then there's something we don't understand.

Chalmers has simply pointed out that there is a class of difficult issues to explain (easy problem) and a class of extremely difficult issues to explain (hard problem)
I have no idea how this can be negated by separating categories. At the end of the day we either have a complete explanation or we don't.

Well, it encourages some open minded reflection and doesn't place arbitrary restrictions on what 'the physical' can achieve. I've also noticed in the last page or so that it is difficult to argue against without falling into the trap it sets. ;)
Pigliucci sure sound "open-minded" ...

Consciousness is a biological phenomenon, like blood circulation, so its appearance in a certain lineage of hominids seems to be squarely a matter for evolutionary biologists to consider[1]

:eek::D

Cheers
 
Broadcast/podcast:
The Life Scientific — Daniel Dennett on the evolution of the human brain

Daniel Dennett talks to Jim Al-Khalili about the evolution of the human brain.

Daniel Dennett has never been one to swallow accepted wisdom undigested. As a student he happily sought to undermine the work of his supervisor, Willard Quine. Only one of the most respected figures in 20th century philosophy, a thinker eminent enough to appear on US postage stamps. Later in Oxford, he became frustrated by his fellow philosophers' utter lack of interest in how our brains worked and was delighted when a medical friend introduced him to neurons. And so began an intellectual quest to understand the human mind that spans five decades. He has always believed that our minds are machines. And anyone who disagrees lacks imagination, he says. Reading The Selfish Gene by Richard Dawkins introduced him to the power of Darwin's theory of evolution. And he has, perhaps, taken Darwinism further than anyone, seeking to explain how we evolved from uncomprehending bacteria to highly intelligent human beings. We know humans and chimpanzees evolved from a common ancestor. And that we share 99 % of our DNA with our closest animal relatives. So why would poetry, ethics, science and literature be somehow cut-off or insulated from our underlying biology? "You've given this much ground. Think about giving a little bit more".
Personally I find Jim Al-Khalili one of the better science presenters on the BBC. The discussion itself, well I found it somewhat dull, but don't let my biases put anyone off ;)
 
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