Bucky
Member
And yet those are the only properties we can enumerate that characterize a conscious being from a non conscious one. As far as we know.Ok, so then instead of the word falsely, I should have used unjustifiably. Just because you happen to observe qualities associated with conscious experience, that doesn't mean that you can say that they are necessary for conscious experience.
This is far from saying that we a complete understanding of the necessary conditions for consciousness, but anything outside of the observable attributes is going to be based on speculation.
Also how can you claim that they are not necessary? If you remove all of the properties you won't be able to distinguish the phenomenon you're trying to investigate in the first place!
Now you're talking about experiences, while I am talking about properties.What about the direct observation that Mystics report? That those qualities are not a part of consciousness itself? That there is a pure consciousness that can be directly experienced?
There can be an infinite amount of different experiences, including the sense of oneness often reported by mystics.
I don't think that seldom occurring experiences can help us define the basic properties of consciousness, but they are certainly interesting.
Rather I would take in consideration NDEs, OBEs and remote viewing (among others) because they seem to involve non-local information, suggesting that consciousness doesn't necessarily depend on the local brain. This is in turn could define a new property, although it is hardly accepted by mainstream science.
Interesting.There would be many more predictions that could falsify the theory such as those dealing with humans or animals.
Regarding testing these types of circuits, I think there are potentially ways of doing this:
1. Psi testing may offer a way to see if an entity is conscious, since it may be that consciousness is necessary for psi (I postulate that it is). A robot that simulates a human but has zero phi should score 25% on the Ganzfeld, while one that has a high degree of integrated information may score higher (although we do not know what level would be needed to be able to use psi).
2. There are potential tests involving quantum theory that may offer a way to test even more simple devices. It involves using retroPK experiments to support a conscious-collapse model, and then using two different recording devices for the data: one with a higher phi and one with zero phi and seeing if it destroys a retroPK capability.
I'd love to see a robot scoring higher than chance in a Ganzfel experiment! :D
Sure, I have never claimed that IIT is totally off track.Yes it is, but why isn't the evidence helping? It is at least showing IIT isn't totally off track. It is more evidence than any theory of consciousness has ever had. Perhaps my proposed experiments could get at the question of simple devices.
Once again. You are misrepresenting my point. Please go back and read what I wrote, there's nothing else to say.You said intuitions. Your intuitions are culturally biased. Their culture doesn't have the same intuitions about consciousness. My point is that intuitions are not reliable.
Also, you should probably make up your mind since you claim in the same post that they are reliable for arguing in favor of free will, but not reliable when used as a skeptical argument against inanimate objects having experiences. :D
How can you call unjustified the empirical facts we know about consciousness?No, you are referring to unjustified inferences. You take observations about our own consciousness and then infer that simple devices need to express these same qualities. This is unjustified inference, not knowledge based on facts.
All I am saying is that to the best of our abilities we describe a certain phenomenon (consciousness) with a number of properties that we can observe with repeatable experiments.
If a certain entity doesn't display any of the properties that characterizes such phenomenon we have to conclude that the entity is likely not conscious. At least until new evidence to the contrary is available.
Now, you insist that it may be conscious anyways. Good. I do not object to it in principle, but it won't be accepted until there is sufficient corroboration..
Hopefully there will be some, or we may it will be different from what we expect... we shall see...
The so empirical support you're referring to has nothing to do with inanimate objects. Those are correlations with parts of the human brain which, by the by, are not fully studied or completely understood.Yes, to the first part, because of the problems of induction. It is not valid logic. You can hypothesize that they would not be conscious because of this, but it is not logically justified. But to the second part, I am saying that a theory with empirical support can be superior because it allows for more accurate inferences.
Where is the evidence supporting first person subjective experience in a bunch of interconnected logic gates?
It's already acknowledged by IIT proponents themselves.We do not yet know if that is a problem.
Wouldn't hurt if you read the article I recommended in the previous post.
No, I am not claiming that we have all of the defining properties necessary for consciousness.You are attempting to infer beyond what the empirical evidence demonstrates.
But of all those currently known, none of them is detectable in inanimate objects. There may be reason for that... but we just don't know.
Integrated informationWhat is that one property?
When Max Planck postulated the quantum hypothesis at the turn of the 20th century they already had a century worth of experimental evidence suggesting that the theory was right. And 25 years earlier Boltzmann had already suggested that the energy levels of a physical system could be discrete.Why baby steps? Revolutionary theories such as quantum theory or relativity theory are not done in baby steps.
All in all it has taken 120 years from the first double slit experiment to the Solvay conference... and 27 years from the Planck's first formulation.
But I am not sure why this is relevant, is there a competition going on?
I stand corrected, I should have said subjective experience.If you are asking of a bacteria has self-awareness, then you may be asking the wrong question. Self-awareness may not be necessary for conscious experience.
Unless of course you also want to object that this is not necessary...
It seems to me you're playing a semantic game where you're trying to match the definition of consciousness with the premises of IIT so that the support for the theory is provided by its own definition... in an endless circular loop.
This is possibly the most annoyong of this otherwise interesting discussion.
Agreed.Because the more support a theory has, the more confidence we can have in its predictions. We see this with quantum theory, since it made all sorts of "absurd" predictions. People tested all sorts of elaborate scenarios and every single time quantum theory was correct. Since the empirical support of all the absurd predictions have all been true, we gain more confidence that other absurd predictions are likely true.
Let's hope IIT follows the same path.
Yes, I recognize the potential it could have to advance the current, almost-completely-stuck, paradigm.I think there is a problem with saying that matter as we now view it can have conscious experience. By itself, IIT doesn't solve the hard problem because of this, but does an enormous amount to offer an explanation of how our conscious awareness arises.
I'd be happy to do that, but you've argued against the reliabilty and usefulness of our intuitions for the past 5 or 6 posts... now I am confused.Well why shouldn't we use our intuitions about free will? How are these intuitions any less evidential than intuitions about what constitutes consciousness?
It looks like a case of having cake and eating it too...
I am not a proponent of panpsychism.You skipped extremely important parts, which I will bring up again. If you propose that panpsychism could offer an explanation, then how does it fit in with quantum theory?
You could forward the question to Koch for example, who is a founder of IIT and a proponent of panpsychism?
Or maybe Tegmarks who's a proponent of MWI and IIT, but it doesn't strike me as an idealist.
I hear you. I sympathize with an idealist position.I have a clear intention with this, because no matter how you answer, the evidence from parapsychology would contradict it. If panpsychism says that consciousness is a property of matter like mass, spin, etc., then it is a local property. If consciousness is a local property of matter, and our consciousness is an aggregate of this local property, then there is no way to explain telepathy. Not only that, PK would also not be possible. This is part of the reason why I feel panpsychism is not a viable option. And if panpsychism is not a viable option, then what is the explanation?
Maybe what you propose could be an interesting mechanism to explain how fundamental/transpersonal consciousness localizes in the physical, in a way that is less abtract than the Kastrup-ian whirlpool / water metaphor.
Though he doesn't seem very excited by IIT, from what I've read. Has anyone proposed an integration of the IIT with his metaphysics? Would make up for an interesting discussion.
Also, isn't IIT describing consciousness as dependent on the local structure of its substrate?
How does it fit with the evidence for non-local retrieval of information, such as the evidence from parapsychology?
cheers