Neil
New
But I asked how do we assess the likelyhood that different entities possess a modicum of consciousness. Not integrated information.
You asked what a sensible approach would be to make a prediction of whether or not a number of entities are conscious are not. Integrated Information Theory is about predicting consciousness, and it has some empirical success at doing this.
Perhaps you were thinking of using our observations from cognitive neuroscience, or from the medical field, to predict whether or not something is conscious. But a set of observations with no real theoretical basis has little predictive power outside of the particular domain in which it was observed. To observe certain qualities (intelligence, creativity, etc.) or use certain methods (like asking for a response) are observations that we apply to assess whether or not humans are, in most situations, conscious. But to attempt to use these observations to predict consciousness in other situations or in other "entities" as you put it, has little predictive power or logical basis. Even in a human, these methods fail in vegetative states, for example, let alone trying to ask whether an octopus is conscious or a photodiode.
These sets of observations have no real theoretical basis, so their predictive power outside the particular domain of mostly normal human states is going to be poor. Let me give an analogy here that will hopefully help: let's say you do not know any classical mechanics, but you make a series of observations such as when you drop objects, they fall to the ground. You may have also noticed that generally objects of different weights seem to, for the most part, fall at the same speed, unless you involve odd shapes. You may have also made the observation that when you throw an object, it tends to arc and then hit the ground. You also were smart enough to see that if you let objects roll down an incline, they tend to accelerate.
Okay, so you have these sets of observations that seems pretty solid. If I were to ask you if a baseball and a bowling ball would fall at the same speed, you would, based on your observations of similarly shaped objects, predict that they would fall at the same speed. You could do this because this scenario is very similar to observations you have made yourself.
But what if I give you a catapult, a projectile, and a distant target, along with some measuring devices, and ask you whether or not this projectile will hit the target given the position of the catapult? What ability to predict do your observations give you in this situation? Very little! You don't have any theoretical basis to relate forces, angles, masses, distances, etc. to do any sort of calculations to make any real prediction as to whether or not the projectile will hit the target. You will be forced to look at it, think, but ultimately guess.
If you had a mathematical theory to use, such as classical mechanics, you could then make an accurate prediction, but that is only because of the mathematical structure of the theory that allows you to make novel predictions. Observations by themselves with no theoretical basis offer little ability to make novel predictions.
So this is why I said I would use IIT when you asked me how, today, I would attempt to predict whether or not an entity is conscious. It has some empirical support in making predictions, and it has the quantitative and mathematical structure that is needed to make novel and accurate predictions in new domains that extend beyond current observations. Observations of qualities of consciousness in higher-order living organisms with no theoretical basis gives me almost no predictive power as to whether or not an octopus or photodiode complex would have any conscious experience.
Bucky said:Not just ours, we recognize many of our “high level” features in many other living creatures.
Following your line of thought maybe cells are also able of intent and creativity without us knowing…
No, that does not follow at all from my line of reasoning. Conscious intention and creativity are qualities of higher-order organisms, and require much more complex structures to enable such abilities, which cells would not have. Just because higher-order organisms other than humans also have those qualities doesn't mean that we can say they are needed to predict consciousness.
Bucky said:It’s not clear to me how IIT can help us discover how these “higher level” features arise from passive, internal subjective experience, although we can’t even be sure IIT is sufficient to explain that aspect.
They arise through the brain structures that are involved in these qualities, and ultimately, how that information is processed and integrated into the conscious experience. Take away your prefrontal cortex and see how it affects your intelligence...
Bucky said:Agreed. The tricky part is when we’re no longer dealing with any organism, but inanimate matter instead.
If the latter also possess a modicum of consciousness, who is to say if every bit of matter is indeed conscious? Since IIT does not solve the problem of the necessary and sufficient conditions for consciousness, I don’t think it can be used to rule panpsychism out.
I think that experimental evidence supporting photodiodes as conscious would make panpsychist proponents very happy.
If there were to be experimental evidence supporting that a photodiode is conscious, that would in fact be very detrimental to panpsychism. The reason is, if this prediction were supported experimentally, it would demonstrate that a photodiode complex requiring other electrical circuits would be necessary for the photodiode to be conscious, while the photodiode by itself would have no consciousness. This would utterly contradict panpsychism.
Bucky said:Experimental design is indeed a problem. If the GCP is onto something we have to deal with non local effects that can affect RNGs from any distance and in ways that aren’t predictable.
Unless we’re looking for some macro-PK effect that really stands out, it is not clear how we’re going to discriminate the effects of global consciousness (which oscillate based on worldly events) and alleged “local” effects caused by the test’s subject.
1. If this objection were so problematic, then why do we have data that supports micro-PK? You insinuate that this would prevent the ability to test for and demonstrate micro-PK since the GCP-type effects would obscure any outcomes. This is clearly false since we have evidence for micro-PK.
2. The GCP data does not support the idea that the RNGs can be affected by "any distance" since the data does show distant-dependent effects.
3. Your objection contains its obvious answer, which is to run experiments and then to consult the GCP data to make sure there were no significant anomalies in the data at the time of your trials. If you compared the data and realized that your trials occurred at the same time as some tragedy, which also corresponded to significant deviations of the RNG data (which not all do), then those trials could be eliminated before statistical analysis is done.
Bucky said:Also, funny side note, in micro-PK experiments the subject is asked to mentally enforce one of two possible outcomes… in which way are we going to ask a photodiode to please intend more ones than zeros? :D
It's pretty obvious that a photodiode could not be used to run such a PK experiment, so I'm not sure your point. If this was in reference to my proposed experiment, then there is no resemblance at all. My experiment involves human subjects attempting a retro-PK effect with a recording device with zero phi, and separate trials with a high-phi recording device.
Bucky said:Additionally, didn’t you claim that intention is not necessary for conscious awareness:
Yes. I see no reason why intention must be required to have an internal experience.
Bucky said:These may not be fatal objections but the likelyhood to produce compelling evidence via this approach seems vanishingly small (if any at all), even with the most optmistic outlook…
Speaking of hasty conclusions....