**Christopher Michael Langan**(born c. 1952) is an American autodidact with an IQ reported to be between 195 and 210.[1] He has been described as "the smartest man in America" as well as "the smartest man in the world" by the media.[2] Langan has developed a "theory of the relationship between mind and reality" which he calls the "Cognitive-Theoretic Model of the Universe" (CTMU).[3][4][5]

http://www.ctmu.org/

An excerpt from one of his articles

While there are important similarities among the kinds of theories dealt with by scientists, mathematicians and philosophers, there are important differences as well. The most important differences involve the subject matter of the theories. Scientists like to base their theories on experiment and observation of the real world…not on perceptions themselves, but on what they regard as concrete “objects of the senses”. That is, they like their theories to be

Of the three kinds of theory, by far the lion’s share of popular reportage is commanded by theories of science. Unfortunately, this presents a problem. For while science owes a huge debt to philosophy and mathematics – it can be characterized as the child of the former and the sibling of the latter - it does not even treat them as its equals. It treats its parent, philosophy, as unworthy of consideration. And although it tolerates and uses mathematics at its convenience, relying on mathematical reasoning at almost every turn, it acknowledges the remarkable obedience of objective reality to mathematical principles as little more than a cosmic “lucky break”.

Science is able to enjoy its meretricious relationship with mathematics precisely because of its queenly dismissal of philosophy. By refusing to consider the philosophical relationship between the abstract and the concrete on the supposed grounds that philosophy is inherently impractical and unproductive, it reserves the right to ignore that relationship even while exploiting it in the construction of scientific theories. And exploit the relationship it certainly does! There is a scientific platitude stating that if one cannot put a number to one's data, then one can prove nothing at all. But insofar as numbers are arithmetically and algebraically related by various mathematical structures, the platitude amounts to a thinly veiled affirmation of the mathematical basis of knowledge.

Although scientists like to think that everything is open to scientific investigation, they have a rule that explicitly allows them to screen out certain facts. This rule is called

*empirical*. Mathematicians, on the other hand, like their theories to be essentially*rational*…to be based on logical inference regarding abstract mathematical objects existing in the mind, independently of the senses. And philosophers like to pursue broad theories of reality aimed at relating these two kinds of object. (This actually mandates a third kind of object, the*infocognitive syntactic operator*…but another time.)Of the three kinds of theory, by far the lion’s share of popular reportage is commanded by theories of science. Unfortunately, this presents a problem. For while science owes a huge debt to philosophy and mathematics – it can be characterized as the child of the former and the sibling of the latter - it does not even treat them as its equals. It treats its parent, philosophy, as unworthy of consideration. And although it tolerates and uses mathematics at its convenience, relying on mathematical reasoning at almost every turn, it acknowledges the remarkable obedience of objective reality to mathematical principles as little more than a cosmic “lucky break”.

Science is able to enjoy its meretricious relationship with mathematics precisely because of its queenly dismissal of philosophy. By refusing to consider the philosophical relationship between the abstract and the concrete on the supposed grounds that philosophy is inherently impractical and unproductive, it reserves the right to ignore that relationship even while exploiting it in the construction of scientific theories. And exploit the relationship it certainly does! There is a scientific platitude stating that if one cannot put a number to one's data, then one can prove nothing at all. But insofar as numbers are arithmetically and algebraically related by various mathematical structures, the platitude amounts to a thinly veiled affirmation of the mathematical basis of knowledge.

Although scientists like to think that everything is open to scientific investigation, they have a rule that explicitly allows them to screen out certain facts. This rule is called

*the scientific method*. Essentially, the scientific method says that every scientist’s job is to (1) observe something in the world, (2) invent a theory to fit the observations, (3) use the theory to make predictions, (4) experimentally or observationally test the predictions, (5) modify the theory in light of any new findings, and (6) repeat the cycle from step 3 onward. But while this method is very effective for gathering facts that match its underlying assumptions, it is worthless for gathering those that do not.