The Tyranny of Physicalism: You’re Either a God or a Goofball

Are you saying there is no evidence for mind-at-large, the fundamental substance in idealism?
Yes. And even if there is a bit of evidence, it doesn't have to be mind-at-large; it could be something else.

How is this different from materialism postulating an ultimately unknowable stuff outside the reach of consciousness?
Sorry, I'm not sure what you're referring to.

Ontologies require a fundamental assumption which then is verified against the rest of our experience and knowledge. Hopefully you undestand that most of the available ontologies are equally compatible with our current understanding of reality. Materialism is actually the most difficult one to endorse from a purely rational standpoint, given its fundamental limitations.
I understand this, yes. The "fundamental limitation" of physicalism is just that people don't think we can get consciousness from brain function. That is a difficult problem, for sure.

If there's one thing Kastrup has done very effectively in his writings is pointing out the physicalists' fallacies and deflate their hubris.
Perhaps, but his metaphysic still requires a giant leap of faith. And he never really tries to show how we can obtain human consciousness from whatever his fundamentals are.

Also, idealism seems a good candidate for a more pasimonoious and elegant way to make sense of the reality we experience and investigate, although I don't have a preferred solution. "Mysterianism" is probably the type of "ism" that I would subscribe to :D
I subscribe to we-understand-as-much-as-we-understand-so-farism.

Ironically you need to be conscious to come up with such a stupid idea :D
Another reason it's not eliminated.

But for any other issues in the physicalist camp promissory notes are more than sufficient... good to see double standards never go out of fashion :)
Again, it's utterly absurd to compare Sheldrake's progress with that of physics and biology in general. I don't mind if he makes a promise. But if he stops there, why would anyone pay a lick of attention?

(By the way, there's actually quite a lot of evidence from already existing experiments with crystals, plants, animals and even galaxies that support MF hypothesis)
I think you are promoting the evidence and ignoring the alternate explanations. Meanwhile, no one is going to care until Sheldrake finds direct evidence of the field.

~~Paul
 
I'm pretty sure that according to Kastrup consciousness is the fundamental, unless you're specifically referring to, as you write, human consciousness, in which case I don't know what you're talking about and neither do you.
 
I'm pretty sure that according to Kastrup consciousness is the fundamental, unless you're specifically referring to, as you write, human consciousness, in which case I don't know what you're talking about and neither do you.
Yes, he has made consciousness fundamental. What we don't know are the properties and behavior of this fundamental. Also, as I said, before, we don't really have anything in our experience to compare to the "nonconscious consciousness" that maintains the state of the world.

It's a perfectly good model, but I don't think it's a slam-dunk against all other ontologies.

~~Paul
 
Yes. And even if there is a bit of evidence, it doesn't have to be mind-at-large; it could be something else.
Perhaps, but his metaphysic still requires a giant leap of faith. And he never really tries to show how we can obtain human consciousness from whatever his fundamentals are.
The metaphysical leap for materialism is even greater, postulating an entire ineffable reality outside consciousness.
It is unkowable by defintion, it can only be inferred.

Another reason it's not eliminated.
You actually have.
You have replaced the fundamental datum of experience, the single most direct experience you can possibly have with a baseless conjecture that throws logic into the waste bin.

If this was a solution to the problem it would at least be an interesting argument for materialists, but this doesn't solve anything! It make things even more impenetrable.

Again, it's utterly absurd to compare Sheldrake's progress with that of physics and biology in general. I don't mind if he makes a promise. But if he stops there, why would anyone pay a lick of attention?
I didn't compare Sheldrake's work to the entire fields of physics, even less biology which I have never mentioned.

Also, as I said, before, we don't really have anything in our experience to compare to the "nonconscious consciousness" that maintains the state of the world.
You're distorting the concept.
Human consciousness is simply a localized manifestation of a larger consciousness, where the brain is the image of such process in mind-at-large.

But this has also an hilarious side because you're defending Dennet who is the one proposing non-conscious consciousness. He's literally saying we're deluding ourselves into thinking our consciousness is a thing, where in fact it is just the illusory product of a bunch of unconsciuous brain processes.

As such consciousness literally does not exist, just like the sawed in half woman doesn't really exist on the magician's stage. It looks like she's split in two, but that's just a trick, It does not exist in our reality.

So long logic and rationality... and thanks for the fish :)
 
The metaphysical leap for materialism is even greater, postulating an entire ineffable reality outside consciousness.
It is unkowable by defintion, it can only be inferred.
Idealism has the equivalent problem. We can only assume that the external world is supported by some form of consciousness. If we cannot experience the external world directly, that produces a problem for any ontology.

You actually have.
You have replaced the fundamental datum of experience, the single most direct experience you can possibly have with a baseless conjecture that throws logic into the waste bin.

If this was a solution to the problem it would at least be an interesting argument for materialists, but this doesn't solve anything! It make things even more impenetrable.
I'm not sure what you are trying to say here. I have not eliminated consciousness. I propose that it is a set of brain functions that appear to be wholistic. This is not illogical, although it is difficult. As is idealism's need to specify how human consciousness is assembled from the fundamentals.

I didn't compare Sheldrake's work to the entire fields of physics, even less biology which I have never mentioned.
You said:

"No, but you said we don't need morphic resonance. To which I've replied that maybe we don't need theoretical physics too, by the same line of reasoning..."

"But for any other issues in the physicalist camp promissory notes are more than sufficient... good to see double standards never go out of fashion."


You're distorting the concept.
Human consciousness is simply a localized manifestation of a larger consciousness, where the brain is the image of such process in mind-at-large.
But Bernardo talks about some form of personal nonconscious consciousness:

"None of this requires that there be another mind ... visionary experiences are simply contents of consciousness that are generated by a segment of consciousness that we do not identify with."

He spends a lot of time in that video trying to eliminate the need for a cosmic consciousness for certain aspects of reality.

But this has also an hilarious side because you're defending Dennet who is the one proposing non-conscious consciousness. He's literally saying we're deluding ourselves into thinking our consciousness is a thing, where in fact it is just the illusory product of a bunch of unconsciuous brain processes.
I don't seem to be able to make myself clear. I am not saying that some form of nonconscious consciousness is out of the question. I am pointing out that once it's nonconscious, we have no way of telling whether it is mind-like or physical-like.

As such consciousness literally does not exist, just like the sawed in half woman doesn't really exist on the magician's stage. It looks like she's split in two, but that's just a trick, It does not exist in our reality.
It exists exactly like computation is a trick of electrical activity. I don't see any logical problem, although, of course, it just might not be true.

~~Paul
 
It exists exactly like computation is a trick of electrical activity. I don't see any logical problem, although, of course, it just might not be true.
Really? Please explain. In what fashion is consciousness "exactly like computation is a trick of electrical activity."

And please be more specific than: "duhhh ... I see the neurons firing therefore that must be consciousness."

My Best,
Bertha
 
Really? Please explain. In what fashion is consciousness "exactly like computation is a trick of electrical activity."
We were talking about Dennett's idea that consciousness is a set of brain processes, none if which are conscious by themselves. Bucky said:

"As such consciousness literally does not exist, ..."

I said that consciousness does exist, but only as the result of those brain processes. In that sense it is like computation. Computation does not exist in and of itself, but is the result of a set of noncomputational electricity manipulation processes.

~~Paul
 
We were talking about Dennett's idea that consciousness is a set of brain processes, none if which are conscious by themselves. Bucky said:

"As such consciousness literally does not exist, ..."

I said that consciousness does exist, but only as the result of those brain processes. In that sense it is like computation. Computation does not exist in and of itself, but is the result of a set of noncomputational electricity manipulation processes.

~~Paul
That's great. Feel free to answer my question.

My Best,
Bertha
 
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Idealism has the equivalent problem. We can only assume that the external world is supported by some form of consciousness. If we cannot experience the external world directly, that produces a problem for any ontology.
Nope... the idealism proposed by Kastrup posits that the qualities of experience are real, not indirect representations of an abstract world re-assembled in the brain. Brain activity is what experience looks like from the outside.

I'm not sure what you are trying to say here. I have not eliminated consciousness. I propose that it is a set of brain functions that appear to be wholistic. This is not illogical, although it is difficult. As is idealism's need to specify how human consciousness is assembled from the fundamentals.
But none of this stuff deals with the problem of subjective experience.
It is an appeal to magical thinking stating that non conscious processes create conscious states.

Consciousness is unique and problematic for physical reductionism because it's in a complete distinctive category that doesn't fit the any other physical phenomenon.
The uniqueness being that there's not just an outside (external, objective) to it but also, and more importantly, the dreaded subjective aspect.

And, cherry on top of the cake, it is the one single requirement we need to even talk about it.

How many non-conscious processes do you need to put together to make a conscious one?
Are 99 insufficient but you add one more, and BAM! Subjective experience! LOL

It's sad to see intelligent people coming up with such ludicrous ideas, only to avoid letting go of the trap in which they have cornered themselves into.

"No, but you said we don't need morphic resonance. To which I've replied that maybe we don't need theoretical physics too, by the same line of reasoning..."

"But for any other issues in the physicalist camp promissory notes are more than sufficient... good to see double standards never go out of fashion."
What is not clear here?

But Bernardo talks about some form of personal nonconscious consciousness:

"None of this requires that there be another mind ... visionary experiences are simply contents of consciousness that are generated by a segment of consciousness that we do not identify with."

He spends a lot of time in that video trying to eliminate the need for a cosmic consciousness for certain aspects of reality.
You realize nonconscious consciousness is just your misrepresentation.
In philosophy, unfortunately, you can't use words randomly. You have quoted a passage that is very clear and made a mess of it.


It exists exactly like computation is a trick of electrical activity. I don't see any logical problem, although, of course, it just might not be true.
Oh boy...

There is nothing mysterious here, by analyzing the circuits in which electricity runs we can see how this done. Electrical impulses are used as bits of information to run different operations. There isn't a subjective side, such as "how does it feel" to add 2 and 2 :)

This is what neuroscience does, follow the neural pathways to discover how vision or motor functions work.
Which tells us exactly nothing about how it feels to see the Eiffel tower or the Big Ben.

Someone like Chalmers would ask "why being conscious at all?". We could just run electrons in our circuits for speaking, moving around, reacting to stimuli without any subjective experience.

Instead people like Dennett need to get rid of the subjective or the whole castle crumbles. It's a bankrupt enterprise.
 
Nope... the idealism proposed by Kastrup posits that the qualities of experience are real, not indirect representations of an abstract world re-assembled in the brain. Brain activity is what experience looks like from the outside.
I understand this, but it doesn't solve the problem of the maintenance of the external world. I do not experience the trees in my yard when I am not looking at them. Why is my experience of them consistent from one viewing to the next?

But none of this stuff deals with the problem of subjective experience.
It is an appeal to magical thinking stating that non conscious processes create conscious states.
I'm not sure why you call it magical thinking just because we don't know how it works yet. Do you call everything magical thinking that we don't yet understand?

Consciousness is unique and problematic for physical reductionism because it's in a complete distinctive category that doesn't fit the any other physical phenomenon.
The uniqueness being that there's not just an outside (external, objective) to it but also, and more importantly, the dreaded subjective aspect.
I'm willing to agree that it's unique.

How many non-conscious processes do you need to put together to make a conscious one?
Are 99 insufficient but you add one more, and BAM! Subjective experience! LOL
It's probably a gradual thing, not a BAM. How many processes do you need to put together to make a living thing?

It's sad to see intelligent people coming up with such ludicrous ideas, only to avoid letting go of the trap in which they have cornered themselves into.
It's also sad to see people think they have a solution when what they have done is let go of one problem but not solved the new problems. How are the trees in my yard maintained when no one is paying attention? Now, you may believe that your new problems will be easier to solve than the Hard Problem, and that is fine. But I believe some modesty is in order. Meanwhile, if the idealist model is fleshed out and evidence is gathered to prefer it over the physicalist model, I'll be perfectly happy.

What is not clear here?
What is not clear is why you said "I didn't compare Sheldrake's work to the entire fields of physics ..."

You realize nonconscious consciousness is just your misrepresentation.
In philosophy, unfortunately, you can't use words randomly. You have quoted a passage that is very clear and made a mess of it.
Bernardo said:

"None of this requires that there be another mind ... visionary experiences are simply contents of consciousness that are generated by a segment of consciousness that we do not identify with."

What is "a segment of consciousness that we do not identify with" if not consciousness that is nonconscious to me?

There is nothing mysterious here, by analyzing the circuits in which electricity runs we can see how this done. Electrical impulses are used as bits of information to run different operations. There isn't a subjective side, such as "how does it feel" to add 2 and 2 :)
I wasn't suggesting that there is a subjective side. I was simply pointing out that computation is not a single thing, but rather the result of a bunch of processes that are not individually computational.

This is what neuroscience does, follow the neural pathways to discover how vision or motor functions work.
Which tells us exactly nothing about how it feels to see the Eiffel tower or the Big Ben.
It tells us nothing so far, but why do you think this is a permanent state of affairs?

Someone like Chalmers would ask "why being conscious at all?". We could just run electrons in our circuits for speaking, moving around, reacting to stimuli without any subjective experience.
Perhaps consciousness makes some of these tasks easier. Planning, for example.

Instead people like Dennett need to get rid of the subjective or the whole castle crumbles. It's a bankrupt enterprise.
I don't believe Dennett has eliminated the subjective.

~~Paul
 
It's also sad to see people think they have a solution when what they have done is let go of one problem but not solved the new problems. How are the trees in my yard maintained when no one is paying attention? Now, you may believe that your new problems will be easier to solve than the Hard Problem, and that is fine. But I believe some modesty is in order. Meanwhile, if the idealist model is fleshed out and evidence is gathered to prefer it over the physicalist model, I'll be perfectly happy.

It is sad to see skeptics continue to advocate the physicalist model after decades of scientific research in quantum physics. Modern physicists have established scientifically there is no physical object present unless an observation takes place. There is no reality that exists independent of our observation. In addition, more recently, the Kochen-Specker theorem has been confirmed a number of times, establishing the outcome of observed reality depends on the observations at the time and cannot be predicted prior to that.

Even more recently there have been the non-delayed quantum erasure experiments showing that no matter if the quantum is showing wave or particle like behavior it is still dependent on a causally disconnected choice. We also know from the violation of the Leggett-Garg inequality there is no separation from the macro world and the quantum world, and larger double slit experiments have been performed with atoms and even molecules. Quantum entanglement between two aluminum chips big enough to be seen by the naked eye has also been carried out.

There is no objective reality beyond what we observe.

My Best,
Bertha
 
I understand this, but it doesn't solve the problem of the maintenance of the external world. I do not experience the trees in my yard when I am not looking at them. Why is my experience of them consistent from one viewing to the next?
We've gone through this already. You keep referring to 18th century idealism.
There is a personal, idiosyncratic layer of the psyche where imagination and visions live and another which is shared. What we call consensus reality.


I'm not sure why you call it magical thinking just because we don't know how it works yet. Do you call everything magical thinking that we don't yet understand?

It's probably a gradual thing, not a BAM. How many processes do you need to put together to make a living thing?
At which point something with 0% consciousness shows 0.000001% consciousness?
Since rational numbers are infinite how many decimals we can use to express a fraction of consciousness?

Welcome to panpsychism! :D A small step for anyone, a giant step for a materialist, LOL

Consciousness becomes a property of matter and the materialist saves his arse from an embarassing situation... or at least he delays it for some time... :)

It's also sad to see people think they have a solution when what they have done is let go of one problem but not solved the new problems. How are the trees in my yard maintained when no one is paying attention? Now, you may believe that your new problems will be easier to solve than the Hard Problem, and that is fine. But I believe some modesty is in order. Meanwhile, if the idealist model is fleshed out and evidence is gathered to prefer it over the physicalist model, I'll be perfectly happy.
I am all for modesty in front of the big questions and also think that the best we can do is come up with models that will probably just scratch the surface.

However not all models have the same explanatory power and materialism has been showing an increasing amount of gargantuan problems. Often underrated or, more likely, swept under the proverbial rug.

What is not clear is why you said "I didn't compare Sheldrake's work to the entire fields of physics ..."
I compared his theory to any of the popular theories in physics.
They both attempt to make sense of observed phenomena by coming up with a solution and searching for experimental confirmation or falsification.

Bernardo said:

"None of this requires that there be another mind ... visionary experiences are simply contents of consciousness that are generated by a segment of consciousness that we do not identify with."

What is "a segment of consciousness that we do not identify with" if not consciousness that is nonconscious to me?
No. It is simply obfuscated, or not directly accessed at the egoic level of mind.

I cannot have direct access to my brother's consciouness. That doesn't mean he's non conscious. There's a separation at egoic level.

I wasn't suggesting that there is a subjective side. I was simply pointing out that computation is not a single thing, but rather the result of a bunch of processes that are not individually computational.
But this is only a valid argument for the so-called "easy" problem of consciousness, where behaviors or reaction to stimuli is deconstructed in terms of computational/neural mechanisms.

Materialism is unable to address the "why" and "how" experience exists. In the world postulated by this philosophy we ought to be biological robots, even in the face of the fact that our nature goes beyond that of automata.

The need for a better philosophical approach is not just driven by impatience or dissatisfaction with the current approach. It is the realization that this model is denying the existence of the single empirical fact of existence that we'll ever be sure of.

I agree with Kastrup's line of thinking that there are far better, more rational and parsimonious conceptions that avoid the tangled mess in which physicalism is cornered into.

And all this with two very welcome advantages:

1) to not contradict any of current empirical and scientific knowledge
2) to include psi phenomena without causing panick attacks to anyone :)

I don't believe Dennett has eliminated the subjective.
When you state that "consciusness is an illusion" you're being pretty clear. Sadly his argument stands on very wobbly grounds: appealing to perceptual illusions is a terrible argument, and the explanation for his thesis doesn't offer anything deeper than that.

Anyone with a shred of intellectual honesty will say that this is, by far, the weakest position we can hold to address the fundamental aspect of existence.

cheers
 
We've gone through this already. You keep referring to 18th century idealism.
There is a personal, idiosyncratic layer of the psyche where imagination and visions live and another which is shared. What we call consensus reality.
I'm referring directly to Bernardo's version of idealism. We have no access to the personal layer where our memories live. Therefore we have no way of knowing whether that layer is some form of consciousness or something else.

"None of this requires that there be another mind ... visionary experiences are simply contents of consciousness that are generated by a segment of consciousness that we do not identify with."

These posts are getting longer and longer, as they tend to do, so I'll respond selectively.

At which point something with 0% consciousness shows 0.000001% consciousness?
I don't know. Perhaps the first glimmer of consciousness had something to do with a rudimentary feeling of pain.

Consciousness becomes a property of matter and the materialist saves his arse from an embarassing situation... or at least he delays it for some time... :)
It's not a property of matter, but a property of some configuration of matter.

However not all models have the same explanatory power and materialism has been showing an increasing amount of gargantuan problems. Often underrated or, more likely, swept under the proverbial rug.
Possibly so. The idealist scientists have the perfect opportunity here.

No. It is simply obfuscated, or not directly accessed at the egoic level of mind.
Yes, I understand that this is the claim. How will we figure out if it is actually so, since everyone is so sure that we can't really know about anything outside our direct experience?

The need for a better philosophical approach is not just driven by impatience or dissatisfaction with the current approach. It is the realization that this model is denying the existence of the single empirical fact of existence that we'll ever be sure of.
Must you continue to repeat this canard? Hardly anyone denies the existence of consciousness.

I agree with Kastrup's line of thinking that there are far better, more rational and parsimonious conceptions that avoid the tangled mess in which physicalism is cornered into.

And all this with two very welcome advantages:

1) to not contradict any of current empirical and scientific knowledge
2) to include psi phenomena without causing panick attacks to anyone :)
Yes, this is all wonderful. Now how is the idealist scientific project going to make progress?

When you state that "consciusness is an illusion" you're being pretty clear. Sadly his argument stands on very wobbly grounds: appealing to perceptual illusions is a terrible argument, and the explanation for his thesis doesn't offer anything deeper than that.

Anyone with a shred of intellectual honesty will say that this is, by far, the weakest position we can hold to address the fundamental aspect of existence.
And yet it's patently obvious that qualia are not all-of-a-piece phenomena and that consciousness has multiple aspects. Otherwise we would not see the results of various brain trauma that we see. Propsopagnosia/amnesia is a good example, and Capgras delusion even a better one. So even if idealists are willing to accept that consciousness just is, they still have to explain:
  • What are the fundamentals of consciousness.
  • What are the laws of consciousness.
  • How is human conscious constructed from the fundamentals.
  • Why does a projection of consciousness, the brain, appear to have effects on consciousness.
  • Why does human consciousness "break."
  • How do all the nonconscious functions work, including memory.
  • Where is memory stored?
  • How does psi work and why isn't it a stronger phenomenon.
  • Is there room for libertarian free will.
Notice how many of these questions are the same regardless of ontology.

~~Paul
 
I'm referring directly to Bernardo's version of idealism. We have no access to the personal layer where our memories live. Therefore we have no way of knowing whether that layer is some form of consciousness or something else.
Not in egoic consciousness, but other conscious experiences suggest we do. Psychoactive drugs seem to open pretty large holes in those obfuscated layers.

And yet it's patently obvious that qualia are not all-of-a-piece phenomena and that consciousness has multiple aspects.
Don't be silly, it is so patently obvious that qualia resists any explanation.

I am talking about subjective experience. "What is it like to..."
Not awareness or memory, much less free will.

Memories can be fallacious, perceptions can be illusory, but subjective experience just is. Whatever is you experience. Illusions still produce an experience. That's why Dennett's position is moot.

Otherwise we would not see the results of various brain trauma that we see. Propsopagnosia/amnesia is a good example, and Capgras delusion even a better one. So even if idealists are willing to accept that consciousness just is, they still have to explain:
No... this really shows that you don't understand what Bernardo proposes.
Honestly, for a couple of bucks you might be better off by buying the electronic version of "Brief peeks beyond" and take a good look at it.

It's not that a knock on the head is outside consciousness :D Similarly any psychoactive drug is an image of a process in consciousness.

What are the fundamentals of consciousness.
There's no fundamental, you're presupposing materialism.

What are the laws of consciousness.
I am not much of a faithful idealist to be able to reply.

How is human conscious constructed from the fundamentals.
Probably not an answerable question, regardless of the philosophical position.

Why does a projection of consciousness, the brain, appear to have effects on consciousness.
Thoughts and emotions are in consciousness. We have an experience of them, therefore no big surprise if there's a continuos interaction.

Why does human consciousness "break."
Not sure what you mean. Maybe sleeping, fainting or coma?
For all we know there could be all sorts of experiences in those states but no memory formation, which for us it's the same as no-experience.

Both coma and NDE patients report experiences from their states. So it's likely that those that don't didn't form any memories, or they did but they're not accessible. As for amnesia.

How do all the nonconscious functions work, including memory.
Interesting question, but we're moving away from the experience problem. Idealism doesn't get in the way of discovering these things anyways.

Where is memory stored?
Another interesting question for neuroscientists.

How does psi work and why isn't it a stronger phenomenon.
Why is it gravity such a weak force? Why does it make any difference...

Is there room for libertarian free will.
Good question for another thread.

Notice how many of these questions are the same regardless of ontology.
Yes, though ontologies such as materialism end up in an unnecessary convoluted mess.
 
No... this really shows that you don't understand what Bernardo proposes.
Honestly, for a couple of bucks you might be better off by buying the electronic version of "Brief peeks beyond" and take a good look at it.

I'm about a third of the way through it. Going to start a thread on this book once I'm done. I'm hoping the ideas discussed in chapter 2 are really fleshed out more by the end!
 
Not in egoic consciousness, but other conscious experiences suggest we do. Psychoactive drugs seem to open pretty large holes in those obfuscated layers.
Or they scramble your brain and cause various hallucinations.

I am talking about subjective experience. "What is it like to..."
I know you are.

No... this really shows that you don't understand what Bernardo proposes.
Honestly, for a couple of bucks you might be better off by buying the electronic version of "Brief peeks beyond" and take a good look at it.

It's not that a knock on the head is outside consciousness :D Similarly any psychoactive drug is an image of a process in consciousness.
I didn't say a knock in the head is outside consciousness. I said that various brain traumas show that our perception of a face, for example, is not a unitary whole. If it was, then it would not be broken by the trauma (however it is that brain trauma feeds back on consciousness to distort it).

So what is Bernardo saying that I don' understand?

There's no fundamental, you're presupposing materialism.
How could there be no fundamental? Isn't some form of consciousness considered fundamental?

Thoughts and emotions are in consciousness. We have an experience of them, therefore no big surprise if there's a continuos interaction.
The brain is also in consciousness. Why does damaging it change consciousness?

(Are you sure you want to say that we experience X, where X is in consciousness? What is it that experiences things in consciousness?)

Not sure what you mean. Maybe sleeping, fainting or coma?
No, I mean something like Capgras delusion. Why does our apparently unitary experience of seeing a familiar face break down? I don't see how it can be considered unitary.

Why is it gravity such a weak force? Why does it make any difference...
Do you think that psi is like a force? If so, why haven't we discovered this fifth force? Is it fundamental?

Yes, though ontologies such as materialism end up in an unnecessary convoluted mess.
So what does science need to do to break through the mess and find the supposedly simple answer?

~~Paul
 
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Then the trees in your yard are random each time you observe them and it is an illusion that they are consistent.

~~Paul

The trees in your yard are an approximation, nature is actually probabilistic, but we understand it as a useful approximation. There's no physical/objective state until we measure/observe, nothing physical or objective maintains the trees in your yard between measurements.
 
The trees in your yard are an approximation, nature is actually probabilistic, but we understand it as a useful approximation. There's no physical/objective state until we measure/observe, nothing physical or objective maintains the trees in your yard between measurements.
Then each viewing is random. The feeling that I remember the trees from the last viewing is an illusion.

~~Paul
 
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