Veganism

Hear the screams? The cries of the carrots?? Tomorrow is harvest day, and for them it's the apocalypse. Thousands will be slaughtered.

I, for one, won't support this massacre. At least not since I learned about the great belief system known as Carnism. I'm happy to announce the establishment of the First Church of Carnism. Join the Carnitarnians today! We meet every Sunday to worship life by smoking brisket. No salad allowed.

Oh and if you really are addicted to vegetables and you're having trouble adjusting to the Carnitarian diet, we also make fake vegetables out of meat. You almost can't tell the difference!

I'm glad someone is finally standing up for vegetables' rights.

Synchronicity: last night I sat in the Brookshires parking lot reading this thread while my significant other was inside buying a bottle of red wine called "Carnivore" as well as a very large package of delicious bacon. We had both for dinner after rescuing our dog from xylitol induced siezures (she ate a whole package of gum) by feeding her meat. We sat on the back porch drinking carnivore wine, feeding our carnivore K-9, and consuming bacon while enjoying the peaceful nighttime sounds of gentle mooing in the adjacent fields. I'm taking this a sign from the universe that my lifestyle is condoned.
 
Heya Neil, thanks for the thoughtful response. I'll try to respond to those of your points which affect the position I'm advocating.

Firstly, you make a suggestion which I have elsewhere termed 'the "plants react, they don't respond" objection"'. As with other many other such objections, I respond to it on the page that I have set up for this purpose, but since I don't really expect anybody to click that link, I'll summarise that response here:

Given that plants are like us in many ways - especially including being living, biological organisms - and very much unlike that which we would typically refer to as "inanimate" matter, it is much more reasonable to assume that behaviour - such as reacting via a lie detector test - which would imply a certain inner experience in us (or in some other animal) implies the same thing in a plant, as opposed to the rather contorted alternative that it instead implies a lack of inner experience, and rather non-feeling, deterministic behaviour, such as would apply to "inanimate" matter. In other words, that plants can and do suffer just like us is the most reasonable interpretation of the findings of experimenters like Cleve Backster and Jagdish Chandra Bose.

I agree with you though that most people currently do not believe that plants can suffer. The challenge is to change minds. Many indigenous cultures do recognise the capacity of plants to suffer; it is a pity that Western culture marginalises and even dismisses indigenous wisdom - the worst offender being that pervasive aspect of Western culture which is modern, proselytising, atheist-scientistic-materialism (whereas it used to be proselytising Christianity that was most to blame).

Re your comments on "absolute" (I prefer "objective") morality, let's start with where we agree: "I do think that moral relativism also has problems. While certain moral judgements may seem extremely relative, such as taking the Lord's name in vain, there are certain judgements that seem essentially universal to humans, like it is morally wrong to torture and kill a child for fun". Exactly! I would argue that any "morality" in which it was OK to torture and kill a child for fun does not deserve that label ("morality"), and this is essentially my point: that to deserve the label "morality", a system of prescriptions requires a basis in certain objective tenets, including the wrongness of avoidable harm. The very fact that humans universally recognise certain wrongs such as the one you provide as an example implies that these tenets (principles) actually do exist. You suggest that this is a species-specific kind of thing; I would counter that the more correct way of looking at it instead is that "morality" itself is a specific definition the conformance to which applies only to certain species, including our own - if an alien race chose to conform its behaviour to a set of rules which were based in "moral" principles that differed vastly from those which we recognise, then... well, that race wouldn't be moral, it would be simply living by a set of immoral/amoral rules! It really is that simple in my view.

With respect to moral "judgement" versus moral "reasoning", I take your point that the former is in practice more "automatic" and "subconscious" - this does not, though, and cannot, invalidate the fact that these automatic/subconscious judgements ought to be compatible with moral conclusions obtained via reasoning to be truly considered "moral": else they are merely arbitrary (and immoral/amoral) rules as of those of our hypothetical alien race.

I agree with you that sharing the "richness of the lives of animals" is likely to be effective in garnering support for their ethical consideration, and I would say that this is as it should be: capacity for experience, whether positive or negative, is, I believe, correlated with moral considerability.

Finally, to the questions you put to me specifically: what you understand my position to be is totally correct, and I'm not sure what more I could add to it, i.e. to the view which you (correctly) attribute to me "that you should avoid avoidable harm, in which case you could say that my situation is wrong simply because they could eat something else, such as fruit". To elaborate: that fruit is bad for diabetics is a myth, and, really, I doubt that there is any realistic scenario in which it would be "necessary" to avoid the carbohydrates in fruit either by the culinary or by the botanical definition.

Even more specifically, you ask "was it morally wrong to kill the deer? If so, why?" Yes, it was morally wrong to kill the deer, for the same reason that it would be morally wrong to "hunt" a human for food - in neither case is the flesh necessary for survival given the alternatives on offer. You make a point of "suffering", yet we know that in the case of humans, "suffering" is only part of the equation; we also believe more roundly in a "right to life" - if we are to be consistent (especially given the concessions you have made with respect to the sophistication of animal experience) then this "right to life" (and not just "right to be free from suffering") applies equally to deer as to humans.

You also ask, "Is killing for food itself morally wrong?" - and you might guess that my answer is "Only where it involves a harm that could have been avoided", so, yes, your subsequent question correctly guesses my response: that killing animals (the deer) for food is wrong only because they (the hunting family) could have instead chosen to avoid animal products and instead consumed food from a source which involves what I maintain to be no or at least comparatively minimal suffering: fruit (by the botanical definition).

By the way, I want to add something to my earlier response to @Grorganic: yes, just to be explicit, I definitely DO affirm the morality of consuming roadkill, and for the reason that you give - that it does not cause avoidable harm. On the other hand, I also think that we are obligated to find ways to avoid animal deaths by traffic in the first place. I would also tentatively affirm the morality of consuming "lab meat" i.e. meat grown from stem cells in a lab rather than that obtained by killing animals. I say "tentatively" only because I am not sure whether there actually is any consciousness even in meat grown in such a way, and because I have this gut feeling that to manipulate life in this way is sacrilegious.

As for the mockery of the rights of plants: I get it, these are "unusual" ideas given our culture; I only hope that on a forum such as this, evidence gets a chance to sway what's considered "normal".
 
Heya Neil, thanks for the thoughtful response. I'll try to respond to those of your points which affect the position I'm advocating.

Firstly, you make a suggestion which I have elsewhere termed 'the "plants react, they don't respond" objection"'. As with other many other such objections, I respond to it on the page that I have set up for this purpose, but since I don't really expect anybody to click that link, I'll summarise that response here:

Given that plants are like us in many ways - especially including being living, biological organisms - and very much unlike that which we would typically refer to as "inanimate" matter, it is much more reasonable to assume that behaviour - such as reacting via a lie detector test - which would imply a certain inner experience in us (or in some other animal) implies the same thing in a plant, as opposed to the rather contorted alternative that it instead implies a lack of inner experience, and rather non-feeling, deterministic behaviour, such as would apply to "inanimate" matter. In other words, that plants can and do suffer just like us is the most reasonable interpretation of the findings of experimenters like Cleve Backster and Jagdish Chandra Bose.

I agree with you though that most people currently do not believe that plants can suffer. The challenge is to change minds. Many indigenous cultures do recognise the capacity of plants to suffer; it is a pity that Western culture marginalises and even dismisses indigenous wisdom - the worst offender being that pervasive aspect of Western culture which is modern, proselytising, atheist-scientistic-materialism (whereas it used to be proselytising Christianity that was most to blame).

Re your comments on "absolute" (I prefer "objective") morality, let's start with where we agree: "I do think that moral relativism also has problems. While certain moral judgements may seem extremely relative, such as taking the Lord's name in vain, there are certain judgements that seem essentially universal to humans, like it is morally wrong to torture and kill a child for fun". Exactly! I would argue that any "morality" in which it was OK to torture and kill a child for fun does not deserve that label ("morality"), and this is essentially my point: that to deserve the label "morality", a system of prescriptions requires a basis in certain objective tenets, including the wrongness of avoidable harm. The very fact that humans universally recognise certain wrongs such as the one you provide as an example implies that these tenets (principles) actually do exist. You suggest that this is a species-specific kind of thing; I would counter that the more correct way of looking at it instead is that "morality" itself is a specific definition the conformance to which applies only to certain species, including our own - if an alien race chose to conform its behaviour to a set of rules which were based in "moral" principles that differed vastly from those which we recognise, then... well, that race wouldn't be moral, it would be simply living by a set of immoral/amoral rules! It really is that simple in my view.

With respect to moral "judgement" versus moral "reasoning", I take your point that the former is in practice more "automatic" and "subconscious" - this does not, though, and cannot, invalidate the fact that these automatic/subconscious judgements ought to be compatible with moral conclusions obtained via reasoning to be truly considered "moral": else they are merely arbitrary (and immoral/amoral) rules as of those of our hypothetical alien race.

I agree with you that sharing the "richness of the lives of animals" is likely to be effective in garnering support for their ethical consideration, and I would say that this is as it should be: capacity for experience, whether positive or negative, is, I believe, correlated with moral considerability.

Finally, to the questions you put to me specifically: what you understand my position to be is totally correct, and I'm not sure what more I could add to it, i.e. to the view which you (correctly) attribute to me "that you should avoid avoidable harm, in which case you could say that my situation is wrong simply because they could eat something else, such as fruit". To elaborate: that fruit is bad for diabetics is a myth, and, really, I doubt that there is any realistic scenario in which it would be "necessary" to avoid the carbohydrates in fruit either by the culinary or by the botanical definition.

Even more specifically, you ask "was it morally wrong to kill the deer? If so, why?" Yes, it was morally wrong to kill the deer, for the same reason that it would be morally wrong to "hunt" a human for food - in neither case is the flesh necessary for survival given the alternatives on offer. You make a point of "suffering", yet we know that in the case of humans, "suffering" is only part of the equation; we also believe more roundly in a "right to life" - if we are to be consistent (especially given the concessions you have made with respect to the sophistication of animal experience) then this "right to life" (and not just "right to be free from suffering") applies equally to deer as to humans.

You also ask, "Is killing for food itself morally wrong?" - and you might guess that my answer is "Only where it involves a harm that could have been avoided", so, yes, your subsequent question correctly guesses my response: that killing animals (the deer) for food is wrong only because they (the hunting family) could have instead chosen to avoid animal products and instead consumed food from a source which involves what I maintain to be no or at least comparatively minimal suffering: fruit (by the botanical definition).

By the way, I want to add something to my earlier response to @Grorganic: yes, just to be explicit, I definitely DO affirm the morality of consuming roadkill, and for the reason that you give - that it does not cause avoidable harm. On the other hand, I also think that we are obligated to find ways to avoid animal deaths by traffic in the first place. I would also tentatively affirm the morality of consuming "lab meat" i.e. meat grown from stem cells in a lab rather than that obtained by killing animals. I say "tentatively" only because I am not sure whether there actually is any consciousness even in meat grown in such a way, and because I have this gut feeling that to manipulate life in this way is sacrilegious.

As for the mockery of the rights of plants: I get it, these are "unusual" ideas given our culture; I only hope that on a forum such as this, evidence gets a chance to sway what's considered "normal".

Thanks for the response, Laird. I intend a detailed response, but before I do I wish to understand your position a bit more.

So in the example of the family killing the deer, it was wrong because it was an avoidable harm, since they could have chosen to eat plant products instead. Considering this, I am curious how you would answer the following questions:

1. If it were the case that animal products were necessary to provide for proper nutrition for most people, would it still be morally wrong to kill animals for food if they were treated well and killed as humanely as possible?

2. If it were the case that animal products were not necessary, yet they provide for a higher level of health (and would reduce health problems), would it still be morally wrong to kill animals for food, assuming best conditions?

3. If it were the case that animals products were better dietary treatment for particular disease states, such as diabetes, would it still be morally wrong to kill animals for food, assuming best conditions?
 
Thanks for the response, Laird. I intend a detailed response, but before I do I wish to understand your position a bit more.

So in the example of the family killing the deer, it was wrong because it was an avoidable harm, since they could have chosen to eat plant products instead. Considering this, I am curious how you would answer the following questions:

Hi Neil,

Whilst I must admit that I am wary of your questions - given that your embolding of the conditionals is totally appropriate, i.e. that none of these scenarios are realistic! - I also recognise that the way a person's ethic handles "tricky" situations helps to define and validate that ethic, so I'm willing to "submit" to your "interrogation".

1. If it were the case that animal products were necessary to provide for proper nutrition for most people, would it still be morally wrong to kill animals for food if they were treated well and killed as humanely as possible?

It would depend on what "proper" nutrition meant. Would "improper" nutrition result only in premature baldness? Then I would say: yes, it is morally wrong to kill animals for the vanity of a full head of hair late into life. But if "improper" nutrition means that one's kidneys fail and one dies in one's teens, then sure, consuming animal products might be justified. Between those extremes, it's a matter of judgement: as I've said, whilst the principle that avoidable harm ought to be avoided is objective, the empirical fact of what constitutes an "unavoidable" harm is to some extent a judgement call. Personally, I would call it with respect for the lives of animals.

2. If it were the case that animal products were not necessary, yet they provide for a higher level of health (and would reduce health problems), would it still be morally wrong to kill animals for food, assuming best conditions?

I think, based on your framing, that the answer is, unequivocally, "No". But let me cut you some slack with a slightly more generous answer:

Again, it depends on what the "higher level" of health is. I could use one of the previous examples to start with: if a full head of hair into late life is a "higher level" of health, then, yes, it is morally wrong to kill animals to obtain it, even in the best conditions. What, though, if a "higher level" of health simply means not suffering from depression three days a week? Again, it's a judgement call. Personally, as I've already written in this thread, I think it would be wrong to slaughter animals for my mental health, and I would advocate strongly for that judgement generically. And I would find it hard to justify slaughtering animals for any "higher" level of health: so long as we have an "adequate" level of health, then I don't think we have that right.

3. If it were the case that animals products were better dietary treatment for particular disease states, such as diabetes, would it still be morally wrong to kill animals for food, assuming best conditions?

This is perhaps the most helpful/useful of your scenarios, because it is a bit more ... specific. Nevertheless, I find that I can only repeat myself: that it depends both on the consequences of the disease (how bad it is to live with) as well as one's personal judgement as to the difficulty of living with those consequences versus the right of animals to live free from harm, and, finally, on an additional condition, namely, how much "better" the consumption of animals is as a "dietary treatment". Again, personally, it would take a pretty bad state of disease, and pretty poor fruit-based alternatives, to convince me that slaughtering animals to remedy it was justified; and in fact I'm tempted to say that such slaughter is outright and undeniably wrong. I think I feel that way intuitively (that it's outright wrong) even whilst recognising that taking a position that I would rather suffer/die from disease than take the life of another being is going to be difficult for other people to understand. But if I was feeling more "testy", I might well defend it in stronger terms.

Thanks for your efforts to understand another guy's perspective, I appreciate it.
 
Hi Neil,

Whilst I must admit that I am wary of your questions - given that your embolding of the conditionals is totally appropriate, i.e. that none of these scenarios are realistic! - I also recognise that the way a person's ethic handles "tricky" situations helps to define and validate that ethic, so I'm willing to "submit" to your "interrogation".



It would depend on what "proper" nutrition meant. Would "improper" nutrition result only in premature baldness? Then I would say: yes, it is morally wrong to kill animals for the vanity of a full head of hair late into life. But if "improper" nutrition means that one's kidneys fail and one dies in one's teens, then sure, consuming animal products might be justified. Between those extremes, it's a matter of judgement: as I've said, whilst the principle that avoidable harm ought to be avoided is objective, the empirical fact of what constitutes an "unavoidable" harm is to some extent a judgement call. Personally, I would call it with respect for the lives of animals.



I think, based on your framing, that the answer is, unequivocally, "No". But let me cut you some slack with a slightly more generous answer:

Again, it depends on what the "higher level" of health is. I could use one of the previous examples to start with: if a full head of hair into late life is a "higher level" of health, then, yes, it is morally wrong to kill animals to obtain it, even in the best conditions. What, though, if a "higher level" of health simply means not suffering from depression three days a week? Again, it's a judgement call. Personally, as I've already written in this thread, I think it would be wrong to slaughter animals for my mental health, and I would advocate strongly for that judgement generically. And I would find it hard to justify slaughtering animals for any "higher" level of health: so long as we have an "adequate" level of health, then I don't think we have that right.



This is perhaps the most helpful/useful of your scenarios, because it is a bit more ... specific. Nevertheless, I find that I can only repeat myself: that it depends both on the consequences of the disease (how bad it is to live with) as well as one's personal judgement as to the difficulty of living with those consequences versus the right of animals to live free from harm, and, finally, on an additional condition, namely, how much "better" the consumption of animals is as a "dietary treatment". Again, personally, it would take a pretty bad state of disease, and pretty poor fruit-based alternatives, to convince me that slaughtering animals to remedy it was justified; and in fact I'm tempted to say that such slaughter is outright and undeniably wrong. I think I feel that way intuitively (that it's outright wrong) even whilst recognising that taking a position that I would rather suffer/die from disease than take the life of another being is going to be difficult for other people to understand. But if I was feeling more "testy", I might well defend it in stronger terms.

Thanks for your efforts to understand another guy's perspective, I appreciate it.

Thanks for the responses. I think I have one more question to ask if you don't mind.

Under normal circumstances, if one were to go out hunting deer in an area where population control is not necessary, is it more wrong to kill for sport than to kill for food?

I am asking because I personally do see a distinction here and want to clarify to see if you see any distinction or if they are equally wrong.
 
Hi all. I've postponed several responses for too long now, so here's an all-at-once response.

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@Neil, it's you to whom my first response is due, and out of concern for space it will unfortunately be somewhat brief and perhaps a little unsatisfying. Re your post #98, I think you've hit on a very important point re the moral relevance of the capacity of beings to suffer, and I appreciate you acknowledging that after all, yes, animals are aware of death and that some even mourn. I think you're missing something though, probably simply because it didn't occur to you rather than out of deliberate exclusion: the capacity of sentient beings for positive experiences and for well-being is equally relevant morally.

In terms of the supposedly lesser consciousness of certain forms of animal life - such as mealworms - I'm less inclined to side with the implications you wish to draw from IIT and more with those from the research of both Cleve Backster, who demonstrated - and which demonstration the popular television show Mythbusters successfully replicated (a link which I've already posted) - that a plant will register emotions via a lie-detector test at the mere thought of a nearby human of harming it, and of Jagdish Chandra Bose, whose Boseian Thesis, based on careful experimentation and study, states that "there is no discontinuity between the living and the nonliving". In other words, I think we ought to be expanding our circle of ethically relevant beings rather than restricting it. For now I think that - for reasons given elsewhere - fruit by the botanical definition is the most sensible exclusion ethically from that circle of concern for the purpose of human diet: at least for those of us who still need to eat, and, unfortunately, I find myself amongst those.

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@Grorganic, re your post #99, in particular your affirmation of moral relativism being a reality over human history: I think I hinted at my position on that in my response to Neil two posts prior to yours: "Empirical uncertainty is one major reason why despite that morality is objective, our moral choices sometimes anyway require the exercise of judgement". In other words, re your example of animal sacrifice being ethical in certain cultures, this, I would expect, is because the animal is seen, in the long run, not to be harmed, because it enters the afterlife with merit for its sacrifice - or there would be a belief in some other counterveiling benefit to the harm of the sacrifice. It is not that it is a valid "culturally relative" ethic to arbitrarily harm other beings; no, the objective moral principle that avoidable harm is wrong applies always, else the culture is not truly an ethical one: all that changes is the empirical beliefs with respect to the nature and implications of the harm in question.

So, this does leave us in a troublesome situation, because I agree with you to the extent that one culture ought not to enforce its empirical/cultural beliefs upon another - at least not without seriously good evidence that the other's beliefs are definitively mistaken and that this mistake is causing avoidable harm. And on a forum such as this, it is necessary to at least countenance the possibility that afterlife consequences mitigate mortal harm, and that a group of people might have valid empirical proof of such a thing, so, yes, I am not in favour of literally and physically forcing Western-derived cultural beliefs on such cultures, and I would hope that any change which does occur does so through the activism of members of the culture in question, after those members having considered the validity of the empirical beliefs upon which their culture's various harmful practices are based.

As far, though, as any argument that culture can justify harms absent any belief in mitigating "unavoidable" factors such as post-mortal merit, then, no, we do not, as I think is already clear, see eye to eye there.

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@Reece, re your post #101, the one with all the teeth in it: I note that with respect to the malformed dentition you refer to the cause not as a "vegan" diet but as a "Western" diet. These are two entirely different things, and so I am not sure that your images have any relevance in this thread.

In earlier posts I expressed a lack of interest in advancing the healthfulness of a vegan diet, but since so much is being made of its apparent unhealthiness, I will reverse that decision and share a few resources which in my opinion more than counter this "argument from poor dental health":

  • The most famous is Dr T. Colin Campbell and son's book, The China Study, which is very well reviewed and summarised by Ernst Erb here. This book lays out a powerful case based on a lifetime of scientific research that a plant-based diet is key to the prevention and even reversal of most common diseases, especially those common in the West. Dr Campbell came from a farming family and was originally convinced that animal products were essential to health; it was the data that changed his mind.
  • The movie, Forks Over Knives, makes a similar case, and includes interviews with Dr Campbell as well as with other notable researchers.
  • Dr Michael Greger's NutritionFacts.org trawls through and summarises the latest research in nutrition so we don't have to, and finds strongly in favour of a plant-based diet. Dr Greger presents yearly talks on the benefits of a plant-based diet based on the latest research; one of my favourites is from 2012, Uprooting the Leading Causes of Death, in which he outlines the ways in which a plant-based diet prevents people from dying from most of the leading causes of death in the USA.

Here Dr Greger's 2012 talk is inline:


So, I see your dentist and I raise you several doctors. And that's just a sampling; there are plenty more sources out there.

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There has also been some talk, both in this thread and elsewhere on the forum, about the supposed invalidation of the hypothesis/es that cholesterol and/or saturated fat can easily be eaten to unhealthy excess, so here are a few resources which counter this talk:

  • In the British Medical Journal blog, Dr Neal D. Barnard and Angela Eakin argue that Yes, cholesterol matters. The key paragraphs in this blog post are these: So how did the Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee arrive at its not-guilty verdict? The committee wrote that its finding of no relationship between dietary cholesterol and serum cholesterol was “consistent with the conclusions of the AHA/ACC report,” citing a 2014 report by the American Heart Association and American College of Cardiology.

    However, the AHA/ACC report did not actually reach this conclusion. It summarized evidence published after 1998—that is, after the most recent meta-analyses were published—and called for more research, but did not suggest that there was no relationship between dietary cholesterol and serum cholesterol. Of course, the issue may be largely theoretical, because most cholesterol-containing foods also contain saturated fat—and both raise LDL cholesterol concentrations.
  • The Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine writes in its article, Cholesterol and Heart Disease: Two large cohort studies and one meta-analysis found that vegetarians had a much lower risk of dying from heart disease than nonvegetarians.11 A study from 2007 in the Journal of Nutrition found that a single fatty meal can cause the heart to beat harder and raise blood pressure. A high-fat, fast-food meal usually has 42 grams of fat, while a typical healthful meal would have around 1.3 grams of fat.12 One study showed that people who adopt a vegetarian diet reduce their saturated fat intake by 26 percent and significantly lower cholesterol levels in just six weeks. A more recent study revealed that when participants switched to a strict low-fat vegetarian diet for about two weeks, they lowered their total serum cholesterol and blood pressure by 11 percent and 6 percent respectively, and men lost an average of 5.5 pounds and women an average of 2.2 pounds.13 --from the section "Go Vegan to reduce your cholesterol and heart disease risk".
  • Despite the potential which we all know for bias on Wikipedia, it is worth noting that the article, Saturated fat and cardiovascular disease controversy, contains these statements in its opening section: [M]ost in the mainstream heart-health, government, and medical communities hold that saturated fat is a risk factor for CVD [...]

    Medical, scientific, heart-health, governmental and intergovernmental, and professional authorities, such as the World Health Organization,[2] the American Dietetic Association,[3] the Dietitians of Canada,[3] the British Dietetic Association,[4] American Heart Association,[5] the British Heart Foundation,[6] the World Heart Federation,[7] the British National Health Service,[8] the United States Food and Drug Administration,[9] and the European Food Safety Authority[10] advise that saturated fat is a risk factor for cardiovascular disease (CVD), and recommend dietary limits on saturated fats as one means of reducing that risk.

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Finally, re @malf's news article, titled "Being A Vegetarian Is Actually Worse For The Environment", unfortunately he's let the skeptic side down with his willingness to post biased news reports of studies which do not reflect the actual findings of the studies in question. A quick bit of googling could have led him to the Huffington Post article, A Study Did NOT Actually Find That Vegetarianism Hurts The Planet, in which the researchers themselves, after being contacted by the HuffPo author, said that the claim that vegetarianism is more harmful to the environment than eating meat is a total mischaracterisation of what they found, and that what they actually found was that not all foods in a particular food group are created equal - a relatively benign finding. If you look at the abstract of the study itself (sorry, I'm not going to pay to download and analyse the full article), you'll see, as mentioned in the HuffPo article, that none of the diets the authors analysed were even vegetarian, let alone vegan, let alone fruitarian. They all included at least seafood and dairy.

Here are some resources which demonstrate how unenvironmentally-friendly the consumption of animal products really is, including in comparison to the vegan option:

  • The 108 or so page 2010 report by the International Panel for Sustainable Resource Management, part of the United Nations Environment Programme, Assessing the Environmental Impacts of Consumption and Production, Priority Products and Materials has this to say on page 79: "Animal products, both meat and dairy, in general require more resources and cause higher emissions than plant-based alternatives", and on page 82 (emphasis mine) "Impacts from agriculture are expected to increase substantially due to population growth increasing consumption of animal products. Unlike fossil fuels, it is difficult to look for alternatives: people have to eat. A substantial reduction of impacts would only be possible with a substantial worldwide diet change, away from animal products". You can read the Guardian's article on this study (at the time, 2010), UN urges global move to meat and dairy-free diet.
  • The 284 page 2006 report, Livestock's long shadow, also thanks to the United Nations, concludes: "As we have seen, the livestock sector is a major stressor on many ecosystems and on the planet as a whole. Globally it is one of the largest sources of greenhouse gases and one of the leading causal factors in the loss of biodiversity, while in developed and emerging countries it is perhaps the leading source of water pollution".
  • The 2014 film, Cowspiracy, takes up this baton and questions whether the silence from environmental organisations on the major role played by animal agriculture, particularly the farming of cattle, in climate change and environmental devastation amounts to a conspiracy.

OK, phew, that's a monster post to return to this thread with. Thanks for sticking with it if you've made it this far. Best wishes to all, and make Christmas also a celebration for the animals and plants that you don't eat. :)
Thanks for the reply, Laird.

I'm afraid neither of us will likely convince the other, so I won't endlessly argue this, but I will make a few comments.

Regarding Weston Price, diet, disease, and teeth: certainly, on whatever side of the fence one's on, we all recognize that there's a lot going on and can't simply be reduced to one single factor. We all are aware there's tons wrong with the western diet regardless of meat vs. no meat. Nevertheless, Price did look at indigenous populations that were vegetarians (and not eating a Western diet) who showed degeneration.

Also, I'm very familiar with The China study and Forks Over Knives. I've seen many, many food documentaries. And I always applaud (and agree with) the "heal with food" thing. I strongly suggest checking out the link below concerning The China study. Her critique is well know and, I believe, serious. Dr. Campbell replied to it (possibly more than once) and that exchange is chronicled in the link.

http://rawfoodsos.com/the-china-study

If I repeat myself here, I apologize: I was 100% vegetarian for years and had problems due to it. There are many of us! During that time I would argue to the death for the superiority of a vegetarian diet: physically, spiritually, morally. So, I'm very familiar with this from both sides. I still eat, and am know by all around me or it, large amounts of fresh produce. I can't tell you how often I'm asked if I'm a vegetarian at work. It can often appear I am. It's just now I know that we have to have fat soluble vitamins from animals as well.
 
Also, I'm very familiar with The China study and Forks Over Knives. I've seen many, many food documentaries. And I always applaud (and agree with) the "heal with food" thing. I strongly suggest checking out the link below concerning The China study. Her critique is well know and, I believe, serious. Dr. Campbell replied to it (possibly more than once) and that exchange is chronicled in the link.

http://rawfoodsos.com/the-china-study

On what basis do you find Minger to have the ability to review the China Study?

And kudos to her for being clear and admitting, right up front, that she is neither a statistician nor an epidemiologist, but an English major with a love for writing and an interest in nutrition

Going back to Price:
For another example, Price discovered many native cultures that were extremely healthy while eating lacto-vegetarian or pisco-vegan diets. Describing one lacto-vegetarian people, for example, he called them, "The most physically perfect people in northern India... the people are very tall and are free of tooth decay." Yet the foundation that operates under his name is strikingly hostile to vegetarians. Sally Fallon, the foundation's president, denounces vegetarianism as "a kind of spiritual pride that seeks ...to shirk the earthly duties for which the physical body is created." She further insults vegetarians by saying they frequently suffer from zinc deficiency, but think it is spiritual enlightenment.

In 1934, Price wrote a moving letter to his nieces and nephews, instructing them in the diet he hoped they would eat. "The basic foods should be the entire grains such as whole wheat, rye or oats, whole wheat and rye breads, wheat and oat cereals, oat-cake, dairy products, including milk and cheese, which should be used liberally, and marine foods." Yet the Weston A. Price Foundation aggressively promotes the consumption of beef, pork and other high-fat meats, while condemning people who base their diets on whole grains.
 
Under normal circumstances, if one were to go out hunting deer in an area where population control is not necessary, is it more wrong to kill for sport than to kill for food?

I am asking because I personally do see a distinction here and want to clarify to see if you see any distinction or if they are equally wrong.

Yes, I see the distinction too: killing for sport is more wrong, because at least when being killed for food, the animal's death serves a meaningful purpose (I don't see the pleasure of a sporting kill as a meaningful purpose).
 
Hi Reece,

Thanks in turn for your reply, and yes, it is unlikely we will resolve this, but I wanted to respond anyway.

I strongly suggest checking out the link below concerning The China study. Her critique is well know and, I believe, serious. Dr. Campbell replied to it (possibly more than once) and that exchange is chronicled in the link.

Yes, I am aware of that critique, have read it and have read Dr Campbell's responses, which seem sufficient to me. There is a mountain of scientific evidence in favour of the health of a plant-based diet.

If I repeat myself here, I apologize: I was 100% vegetarian for years and had problems due to it. There are many of us!

By "100% vegetarian" do you mean vegan? Why do you think you couldn't fix your problems by adjusting your diet without adding animal products back in, as others have done?

It's just now I know that we have to have fat soluble vitamins from animals as well.

How is it that you "know" something that so many of us vegans know is not true?
 
Heya Neil, thanks for the thoughtful response. I'll try to respond to those of your points which affect the position I'm advocating.

Firstly, you make a suggestion which I have elsewhere termed 'the "plants react, they don't respond" objection"'. As with other many other such objections, I respond to it on the page that I have set up for this purpose, but since I don't really expect anybody to click that link, I'll summarise that response here:

Given that plants are like us in many ways - especially including being living, biological organisms - and very much unlike that which we would typically refer to as "inanimate" matter, it is much more reasonable to assume that behaviour - such as reacting via a lie detector test - which would imply a certain inner experience in us (or in some other animal) implies the same thing in a plant, as opposed to the rather contorted alternative that it instead implies a lack of inner experience, and rather non-feeling, deterministic behaviour, such as would apply to "inanimate" matter. In other words, that plants can and do suffer just like us is the most reasonable interpretation of the findings of experimenters like Cleve Backster and Jagdish Chandra Bose.

I agree with you though that most people currently do not believe that plants can suffer. The challenge is to change minds. Many indigenous cultures do recognise the capacity of plants to suffer; it is a pity that Western culture marginalises and even dismisses indigenous wisdom - the worst offender being that pervasive aspect of Western culture which is modern, proselytising, atheist-scientistic-materialism (whereas it used to be proselytising Christianity that was most to blame).

Re your comments on "absolute" (I prefer "objective") morality, let's start with where we agree: "I do think that moral relativism also has problems. While certain moral judgements may seem extremely relative, such as taking the Lord's name in vain, there are certain judgements that seem essentially universal to humans, like it is morally wrong to torture and kill a child for fun". Exactly! I would argue that any "morality" in which it was OK to torture and kill a child for fun does not deserve that label ("morality"), and this is essentially my point: that to deserve the label "morality", a system of prescriptions requires a basis in certain objective tenets, including the wrongness of avoidable harm. The very fact that humans universally recognise certain wrongs such as the one you provide as an example implies that these tenets (principles) actually do exist. You suggest that this is a species-specific kind of thing; I would counter that the more correct way of looking at it instead is that "morality" itself is a specific definition the conformance to which applies only to certain species, including our own - if an alien race chose to conform its behaviour to a set of rules which were based in "moral" principles that differed vastly from those which we recognise, then... well, that race wouldn't be moral, it would be simply living by a set of immoral/amoral rules! It really is that simple in my view.

With respect to moral "judgement" versus moral "reasoning", I take your point that the former is in practice more "automatic" and "subconscious" - this does not, though, and cannot, invalidate the fact that these automatic/subconscious judgements ought to be compatible with moral conclusions obtained via reasoning to be truly considered "moral": else they are merely arbitrary (and immoral/amoral) rules as of those of our hypothetical alien race.

I agree with you that sharing the "richness of the lives of animals" is likely to be effective in garnering support for their ethical consideration, and I would say that this is as it should be: capacity for experience, whether positive or negative, is, I believe, correlated with moral considerability.

Finally, to the questions you put to me specifically: what you understand my position to be is totally correct, and I'm not sure what more I could add to it, i.e. to the view which you (correctly) attribute to me "that you should avoid avoidable harm, in which case you could say that my situation is wrong simply because they could eat something else, such as fruit". To elaborate: that fruit is bad for diabetics is a myth, and, really, I doubt that there is any realistic scenario in which it would be "necessary" to avoid the carbohydrates in fruit either by the culinary or by the botanical definition.

Even more specifically, you ask "was it morally wrong to kill the deer? If so, why?" Yes, it was morally wrong to kill the deer, for the same reason that it would be morally wrong to "hunt" a human for food - in neither case is the flesh necessary for survival given the alternatives on offer. You make a point of "suffering", yet we know that in the case of humans, "suffering" is only part of the equation; we also believe more roundly in a "right to life" - if we are to be consistent (especially given the concessions you have made with respect to the sophistication of animal experience) then this "right to life" (and not just "right to be free from suffering") applies equally to deer as to humans.

You also ask, "Is killing for food itself morally wrong?" - and you might guess that my answer is "Only where it involves a harm that could have been avoided", so, yes, your subsequent question correctly guesses my response: that killing animals (the deer) for food is wrong only because they (the hunting family) could have instead chosen to avoid animal products and instead consumed food from a source which involves what I maintain to be no or at least comparatively minimal suffering: fruit (by the botanical definition).

By the way, I want to add something to my earlier response to @Grorganic: yes, just to be explicit, I definitely DO affirm the morality of consuming roadkill, and for the reason that you give - that it does not cause avoidable harm. On the other hand, I also think that we are obligated to find ways to avoid animal deaths by traffic in the first place. I would also tentatively affirm the morality of consuming "lab meat" i.e. meat grown from stem cells in a lab rather than that obtained by killing animals. I say "tentatively" only because I am not sure whether there actually is any consciousness even in meat grown in such a way, and because I have this gut feeling that to manipulate life in this way is sacrilegious.

As for the mockery of the rights of plants: I get it, these are "unusual" ideas given our culture; I only hope that on a forum such as this, evidence gets a chance to sway what's considered "normal".

Laird,

Regarding the notion of plant suffering, what does it mean to suffer? I am fascinated by what I have learned about how plants can respond and learn, and it seems even have a telepathic response, but I am struggling to attribute the term "suffering" to a conscious organism with no brain or CNS.

For example, humans can automatically and unconsciously respond to say something hot or to some sort of physical injury, but that system seems quite different from suffering. How do you attribute suffering to a plant? The conductance changes do not seem to support attribution of suffering. And considering no brain or CNS, I am not clear on how the term suffering can be attributed at all. I am not even sure that a plant may feel pain in any way like we do since they have no brain/CNS. I am not saying they have no experience, but it certainly cannot be as rich as ours, and as such, seem that they would lack many of our experiences.
 
Heya Neil, thanks for the thoughtful response. I'll try to respond to those of your points which affect the position I'm advocating.

Firstly, you make a suggestion which I have elsewhere termed 'the "plants react, they don't respond" objection"'. As with other many other such objections, I respond to it on the page that I have set up for this purpose, but since I don't really expect anybody to click that link, I'll summarise that response here:

Given that plants are like us in many ways - especially including being living, biological organisms - and very much unlike that which we would typically refer to as "inanimate" matter, it is much more reasonable to assume that behaviour - such as reacting via a lie detector test - which would imply a certain inner experience in us (or in some other animal) implies the same thing in a plant, as opposed to the rather contorted alternative that it instead implies a lack of inner experience, and rather non-feeling, deterministic behaviour, such as would apply to "inanimate" matter. In other words, that plants can and do suffer just like us is the most reasonable interpretation of the findings of experimenters like Cleve Backster and Jagdish Chandra Bose.

I agree with you though that most people currently do not believe that plants can suffer. The challenge is to change minds. Many indigenous cultures do recognise the capacity of plants to suffer; it is a pity that Western culture marginalises and even dismisses indigenous wisdom - the worst offender being that pervasive aspect of Western culture which is modern, proselytising, atheist-scientistic-materialism (whereas it used to be proselytising Christianity that was most to blame).

Re your comments on "absolute" (I prefer "objective") morality, let's start with where we agree: "I do think that moral relativism also has problems. While certain moral judgements may seem extremely relative, such as taking the Lord's name in vain, there are certain judgements that seem essentially universal to humans, like it is morally wrong to torture and kill a child for fun". Exactly! I would argue that any "morality" in which it was OK to torture and kill a child for fun does not deserve that label ("morality"), and this is essentially my point: that to deserve the label "morality", a system of prescriptions requires a basis in certain objective tenets, including the wrongness of avoidable harm. The very fact that humans universally recognise certain wrongs such as the one you provide as an example implies that these tenets (principles) actually do exist. You suggest that this is a species-specific kind of thing; I would counter that the more correct way of looking at it instead is that "morality" itself is a specific definition the conformance to which applies only to certain species, including our own - if an alien race chose to conform its behaviour to a set of rules which were based in "moral" principles that differed vastly from those which we recognise, then... well, that race wouldn't be moral, it would be simply living by a set of immoral/amoral rules! It really is that simple in my view.

With respect to moral "judgement" versus moral "reasoning", I take your point that the former is in practice more "automatic" and "subconscious" - this does not, though, and cannot, invalidate the fact that these automatic/subconscious judgements ought to be compatible with moral conclusions obtained via reasoning to be truly considered "moral": else they are merely arbitrary (and immoral/amoral) rules as of those of our hypothetical alien race.

I agree with you that sharing the "richness of the lives of animals" is likely to be effective in garnering support for their ethical consideration, and I would say that this is as it should be: capacity for experience, whether positive or negative, is, I believe, correlated with moral considerability.

Finally, to the questions you put to me specifically: what you understand my position to be is totally correct, and I'm not sure what more I could add to it, i.e. to the view which you (correctly) attribute to me "that you should avoid avoidable harm, in which case you could say that my situation is wrong simply because they could eat something else, such as fruit". To elaborate: that fruit is bad for diabetics is a myth, and, really, I doubt that there is any realistic scenario in which it would be "necessary" to avoid the carbohydrates in fruit either by the culinary or by the botanical definition.

Even more specifically, you ask "was it morally wrong to kill the deer? If so, why?" Yes, it was morally wrong to kill the deer, for the same reason that it would be morally wrong to "hunt" a human for food - in neither case is the flesh necessary for survival given the alternatives on offer. You make a point of "suffering", yet we know that in the case of humans, "suffering" is only part of the equation; we also believe more roundly in a "right to life" - if we are to be consistent (especially given the concessions you have made with respect to the sophistication of animal experience) then this "right to life" (and not just "right to be free from suffering") applies equally to deer as to humans.

You also ask, "Is killing for food itself morally wrong?" - and you might guess that my answer is "Only where it involves a harm that could have been avoided", so, yes, your subsequent question correctly guesses my response: that killing animals (the deer) for food is wrong only because they (the hunting family) could have instead chosen to avoid animal products and instead consumed food from a source which involves what I maintain to be no or at least comparatively minimal suffering: fruit (by the botanical definition).

By the way, I want to add something to my earlier response to @Grorganic: yes, just to be explicit, I definitely DO affirm the morality of consuming roadkill, and for the reason that you give - that it does not cause avoidable harm. On the other hand, I also think that we are obligated to find ways to avoid animal deaths by traffic in the first place. I would also tentatively affirm the morality of consuming "lab meat" i.e. meat grown from stem cells in a lab rather than that obtained by killing animals. I say "tentatively" only because I am not sure whether there actually is any consciousness even in meat grown in such a way, and because I have this gut feeling that to manipulate life in this way is sacrilegious.

As for the mockery of the rights of plants: I get it, these are "unusual" ideas given our culture; I only hope that on a forum such as this, evidence gets a chance to sway what's considered "normal".

Laird,

Regarding the notion of plant suffering, what does it mean to suffer? I am fascinated by what I have learned about how plants can respond and learn, and it seems even have a telepathic response, but I am struggling to attribute the term "suffering" to a conscious organism with no brain or CNS.

For example, humans can automatically and unconsciously respond to say something hot or to some sort of physical injury, but that system seems quite different from suffering. How do you attribute suffering to a plant? The conductance changes do not seem to support attribution of suffering. And considering no brain or CNS, I am not clear on how the term suffering can be attributed at all. I am not even sure that a plant may feel pain in any way like we do since they have no brain/CNS. I am not saying they have no experience, but it certainly cannot be as rich as ours, and as such, seem that they would lack many of our experiences.
 
Laird,

Regarding the notion of plant suffering, what does it mean to suffer? I am fascinated by what I have learned about how plants can respond and learn, and it seems even have a telepathic response, but I am struggling to attribute the term "suffering" to a conscious organism with no brain or CNS.

For example, humans can automatically and unconsciously respond to say something hot or to some sort of physical injury, but that system seems quite different from suffering. How do you attribute suffering to a plant? The conductance changes do not seem to support attribution of suffering. And considering no brain or CNS, I am not clear on how the term suffering can be attributed at all. I am not even sure that a plant may feel pain in any way like we do since they have no brain/CNS. I am not saying they have no experience, but it certainly cannot be as rich as ours, and as such, seem that they would lack many of our experiences.

Hi Neil,

Well, I'd simply ask you in return: if a plant can learn and respond, including telepathically, without a brain or CNS, then why would you doubt that they can also suffer too without a brain or CNS? (I'm taking your "what does it mean to suffer?" question as rhetorical).

And if you do question it, would you at least recognise that it remains a strong possibility given the evidence, and that they deserve the benefit of the doubt?
 
I'll respond to north and Laird's earlier comments later when I have more time, but I can't help but want to point out that suffering is something that occurs because we live continually in the past and future. While I tend to believe there's consciousness in everything even if only manifested as something more appropriately called unconsciousness (with things like seemingly inanimate objects), I tend to think that humans are the probably the only ones to live (almost) continually in the past and future, away from the present moment. This is what I believe suffering really stems from and is radically different than experiencing pain or discomfort (and then it's natural passing as well). While I can easily imagine plants experiencing pain or even possibly fear (?), I have a hard time using the word suffering. Sorry if that's a quibble. I think of the word in a more buddistic sense.

Certainly many animals grieve and that seems pretty close to suffering, but I'm still not sure it's the same thing.

(I'm not, by the way, making light of the pain experienced by other life forms. If anything, I might say we should "learn from them" how to experience then let go.)
 
Hi Neil,

Well, I'd simply ask you in return: if a plant can learn and respond, including telepathically, without a brain or CNS, then why would you doubt that they can also suffer too without a brain or CNS? (I'm taking your "what does it mean to suffer?" question as rhetorical).

And if you do question it, would you at least recognise that it remains a strong possibility given the evidence, and that they deserve the benefit of the doubt?


I don't see any basis for attributing the concept of suffering to an organism without any brain or CNS. The term suffering seems to me to be a rich experience, and is different from the experience of pain. For example, if someone pinches me, I can experience pain but not experience any suffering.

Pain can also be experienced and dealt with unconsciously, where if you hooked me up to all kinds of measuring devices while I was sleep walking and burned my hand, you could measure all kinds of responses that occurred, yet I felt no pain and did not suffer.

I am not sure how I can attribute suffering to a plant just because it can learn. You can make computer programs that can learn to play video games, but that does not mean that they are even conscious let alone able to suffer.

The ability to respond to psychic intent also does not seem like I can use this to attribute suffering to a plant. If a quantum particle system in a RNG can respond to my psychic intent, I would not be quick to assume that any response to psychic intent means that there is any suffering.

The plants are probably conscious, and by definition this means that I think they have an internal experience, but I am not sure what that internal experience might be like at all. We are only able to understand our very rich internal experience that results from highly complex brain and nervous systems, and it already seems difficult enough to understand what a mouse might experience internally, let alone an organism without any brain or nervous system.

I think the ability to respond to threats is very distinct from the experience of pain, and I think that the experience of pain is different from the concept of suffering, and suffering, to me, seems to be something that likely emerges in life forms much lower than us in rudimentary forms, but is a complex experience that likely requires some form of brain/CNS in order to construct such a rich experience.

This does not mean that I would support senseless destruction of plants. I think there are many reasons not to do such harm, and if one also understands that plants also share a level of consciousness, then I think it would further discourage such behavior, but I think this can be done without attributing suffering to plants.
 
Reece, re non-humans living in the past/future: whether or not they do so less than humans, I think there is plenty of evidence that they do both relive the past and anticipate the future. Here are four examples:

  1. When an animal caught in a steel trap gnaws off its own foot to escape, it is anticipating the hunter returning and slaughtering it.
  2. When the Clark's nutcracker stores between 5,000 and 20,000 treasure maps in its head, it is planning for its future.
  3. (As already raised in this thread) When elephants stop at the site of a dead relative to mourn, they are recalling that relative's past existence.
  4. Plants anticipate future conditions through trajectory sensitivity.

It is all too easy to assume that these are cases of deterministic instinct rather than of conscious will, but I think we need to strongly challenge that assumption: the evidence is increasingly swinging the other way, and, besides, they deserve the benefit of the doubt.

Neil, you say you see no basis for attributing suffering to an organism without a brain or a CNS, yet isn't that exactly what happens during negative NDEs, when the experiencer lacks a functioning brain?

I would also add to this that (many? most? all?) indigenous cultures have recognised that at least some plants have a conscious spirit which can be communicated with, which should not be such a controversial idea on this forum.

But generally, I am not sure what more I can add to my earlier response:

Given that plants are like us in many ways - especially including being living, biological organisms - and very much unlike that which we would typically refer to as "inanimate" matter, it is much more reasonable to assume that behaviour - such as reacting via a lie detector test - which would imply a certain inner experience in us (or in some other animal) implies the same thing in a plant, as opposed to the rather contorted alternative that it instead implies a lack of inner experience, and rather non-feeling, deterministic behaviour, such as would apply to "inanimate" matter. In other words, that plants can and do suffer just like us is the most reasonable interpretation of the findings of experimenters like Cleve Backster and Jagdish Chandra Bose.

Perhaps there is little further we can explore this disagreement unless/until further evidence comes to light. It is, after all, something which it is hard to prove or disprove absolutely.
 
:D

Heya Neil, thanks for the thoughtful response.
Thanks for the response, Laird. I intend a detailed response, but before I do I wish to understand your position a bit more.
Hi Neil,
Whilst I must admit that I am wary of your questions - given that your embolding of the conditionals is totally appropriate
Thanks for the responses. I think I have one more question to ask if you don't mind.
Thanks for the reply, Laird.
Yes, I see the distinction too
 
Reece, re non-humans living in the past/future: whether or not they do so less than humans, I think there is plenty of evidence that they do both relive the past and anticipate the future. Here are four examples:

  1. When an animal caught in a steel trap gnaws off its own foot to escape, it is anticipating the hunter returning and slaughtering it.
  2. When the Clark's nutcracker stores between 5,000 and 20,000 treasure maps in its head, it is planning for its future.
  3. (As already raised in this thread) When elephants stop at the site of a dead relative to mourn, they are recalling that relative's past existence.
  4. Plants anticipate future conditions through trajectory sensitivity.

It is all too easy to assume that these are cases of deterministic instinct rather than of conscious will, but I think we need to strongly challenge that assumption: the evidence is increasingly swinging the other way, and, besides, they deserve the benefit of the doubt.

I think in these cases there is attribution of qualities that I do not see justified. I don't see how we can determine that an animal in a trap "knows the hunter is returning to slaughter it," particularly because it very likely that the animal doesn't even know what a hunter is, let alone that it will come back, let alone "slaughter" it. It seems much more likely that it perceives a threat to its survival by being caught Ina trap that not only hurt them, but also they cannot escape otherwise. In the second example, I don't see how the ability to store learn and remember means that it is "planning for the future." And the elephant mourning could be an affective reaction to the recognition of death and the emotional pain of that occurrence, not that it was thinking of the animal in the past. That just seems like an unjustified leap.

I am not saying animals are not conscious, or that they do not feel emotional pain (at least a lot seem to), or they cannot mourn, but there just seems to be too much stretching and attributing more complex human qualities to the animals. I am saying I could be wrong, but I would want to see some sort of evidence that actually indicates such cognitive abilities.


Laird said:
Neil, you say you see no basis for attributing suffering to an organism without a brain or a CNS, yet isn't that exactly what happens during negative NDEs, when the experiencer lacks a functioning brain?

I would also add to this that (many? most? all?) indigenous cultures have recognised that at least some plants have a conscious spirit which can be communicated with, which should not be such a controversial idea on this forum


But it seems that the brain and CNS was likely necessary to establish the informational relations that persist after death.

Regarding plant spirits, I again think they are conscious, but I am not inclined to take the claim of the indigenous cultures without criticism. It could be that the communication did not involve cognitive abilities that you wish to attribute to plants.
 
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