Why was consciousness naturally selected?

[Plato's Cavern]

Same question... how does a collection of things (which I presume don't have subjective experience) produce direct, 1st person experience?
Which are the necessary and sufficient "things" that put together produce this magic?

I'm quite sure that if you could pack a sufficent amount of hardware within a plastic box, pile up the circuits as a mad, you would reach the point where a critical mass of electric connexions would you fire up a kind of singularity and an awarness would rise amongst that pile of plastic and wires. That thing would claim to have a first person experience, but if you plug a mother card or two out of the thing, there goes its first person experience.
It's just piling up processes until the illusion of existence pops up within the robot. And, I reckon robots we are. Flesh n bones ones, but nontheless.
Please spare insults, I'm just making my point for the sake of a nice discussion and don't like the tone of some members as soon as their paradigm gets shaked.

 

[Neil]

I'm quite sure that if you could pack a sufficent amount of hardware within a plastic box, pile up the circuits as a mad, you would reach the point where a critical mass of electric connexions would you fire up a kind of singularity and an awarness would rise amongst that pile of plastic and wires. That thing would claim to have a first person experience, but if you plug a mother card or two out of the thing, there goes its first person experience.
It's just piling up processes until the illusion of existence pops up within the robot. And, I reckon robots we are. Flesh n bones ones, but nontheless.
Please spare insults, I'm just making my point for the sake of a nice discussion and don't like the tone of some members as soon as their paradigm gets shaked.

Based on Integrated Information Theory, the only quantitative and mathematical theory of consciousness, this would not occur; piling up of processing would never result in consciousness.

 

[Neil]

I entered this thread way too late, so I apologize for anything I missed.

My answer to the original question would be that it was selected for because it is causally affective.

 

[Neil]

Ah I see... you're playing the panpsychist card. Well done :)
Well at least a group of materialist have moved on (Tegmark, Koch, etc...) and jumped on this bandwagon, the implications of which are that our thermostats are probably a little conscious and our smartphones certainly are.

IIT does not say that smartphones and thermostats are conscious. They do not properly process and integrate information.

ETA: and what about the internet. If we had a consciousness meter, would it go off the scale? ( it takes 33000+ brains to hold all of the estimated data of the internet )

This also doesn't process and integrate the information.

The simple but fundamental criticism to this approach is that it won't touch the Hard Problem.
Given any third-person observations, one could always imagine a universe that is consistent with those facts in which no one experiences anything.

I find these criticisms very uncompelling. So what if someone can imagine a universe without any experience? I can imagine the world of Lord of the Rings, but does that really mean anything? I would say that it could be argued that a universe without any experience doesn't exist which nullifies the argument.

But this is not to dismiss the theory, which is important... only it won't do what it pompously claim to be going to do. (solving the hard problem, that is)

It will take some work from outside the theory to do this, but when combined with accurate measurements of our conscious states along with subjective reporting, combined with an updated metaphysics, I think it can offer an explanation for th hard problem.

 

[Neil]

I am not sure about what you're trying to say. Can you clarify?
I was suggesting to jump on the panpsychist wagon as I see it as "safety exit" for materialists stumped by the hard problem of consciousness (and of QM measurement, incidentally).

How is panpsychism attempting to explain the measurement problem?

 

[Bucky]

IIT does not say that smartphones and thermostats are conscious. They do not properly process and integrate information.ˆ

John Searle, among others, has done a good job at pointing this out in one of his critiques:
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/mar/07/can-photodiode-be-conscious/

It will take some work from outside the theory to do this, but when combined with accurate measurements of our conscious states along with subjective reporting, combined with an updated metaphysics, I think it can offer an explanation for th hard problem.

Good for you, I am just not that optmistic.

 

[Bucky]

I'm quite sure that if you could pack a sufficent amount of hardware within a plastic box, pile up the circuits as a mad, you would reach the point where a critical mass of electric connexions would you fire up a kind of singularity and an awarness would rise amongst that pile of plastic and wires. That thing would claim to have a first person experience, but if you plug a mother card or two out of the thing, there goes its first person experience.
It's just piling up processes until the illusion of existence pops up within the robot. And, I reckon robots we are. Flesh n bones ones, but nontheless.
Please spare insults, I'm just making my point for the sake of a nice discussion and don't like the tone of some members as soon as their paradigm gets shaked.

I rarely insult anyone, rather I envy your faith.

ETA... the interesting aspect of this idea is the introduction of pure magic into a materialist approach, which I think is fascinating and kind of testifies the kind of confusion in which our mainstream culture is at this point.

We take at face value the "evidence" that we ought to be meat robots and for the other stuff, that doesn't fit in the model, we are ready to accept pure magic as the most sensible explanation.

 

[Bucky]

How is panpsychism attempting to explain the measurement problem?

Oh I am not saying that panpsychism is going to solve that particular problem, but at least there are some new ideas about it (*)
I was just mentioning some of the main stumbling blocks faced by the current state of materialism. Jumping on the panpsychist bandwagon would at least allow for some progress to be made. Possibly to stumble upon even bigger blocks, but that's how it works.

(*)
A possible quantum basis of Panpsychism
A quantum physical argument for Panpsychism

cheers

 

[Neil]

John Searle, among others, has done a good job at pointing this out in one of his critiques:
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/mar/07/can-photodiode-be-conscious/

I'm not sure I understand your point here. Searle is confused about IIT. Perhaps he should read Tononi's papers on IIT rather than Koch's book, because Tononi's papers address his points clearly. Smartphones do not process and integrate information in such a way to create consciousness; their phi is zero. It is not a version of panpsychism, either.

At the fundamental particle level, it also does not fit the requirements of IIT to say that quark systems have a level of consciousness since there is no exclusion in the quantum information contained in the particle systems (i.e. the Scrodinger equation describes superposed eigenstates).

 

[Neil]

Oh I am not saying that panpsychism is going to solve that particular problem, but at least there are some new ideas about it (*)
I was just mentioning some of the main stumbling blocks faced by the current state of materialism. Jumping on the panpsychist bandwagon would at least allow for some progress to be made. Possibly to stumble upon even bigger blocks, but that's how it works.

(*)
A possible quantum basis of Panpsychism
A quantum physical argument for Panpsychism

cheers

In the first paper:

[...]
panpsychism and emergentism are the only two main positions that can complete the integration. Then we must decide whether and how consciousness emerges from mere matter or whether consciousness is a fundamental property of matter.

It's funny how it is said that consciousness must be a property of matter. Through this assumption, they have made a false assumption that there are only two options to explain the integration.

It is shown that consciousness may help to distinguish the nonorthogonal single states in the framework of revised quantum dynamics, while the usual physical measuring device can't.

Sure, this is the structure of the orthodox Copenhagen interpretation. A conscious choice on the part of the experimenter is required to orient the basis vectors to calculate the probability distributions. Attempts to eliminate this step creates the basis problem.

The fact that consciousness violates the basic physical principle also reveals that consciousness is a fundamental property of matter, and a complete theory of matter must involve consciousness.

I don't get the logic behind saying that consciousness must be a property of matter. That consciousness is involved seems evident based on the fact that it was incorporated into the original Copenhagen interpretation, but it does not follow that it is a property of matter.

but one thing is certain for the revised quantum dynamics, i.e. the collapse process of wave function is one kind of dynamical process, and it will take a finite time interval to finish. The following analysis will only rely on this common character of revised quantum dynamics.

So here he is stating that he is assuming an objective collapse model, such as the GRW or Penrose Objective Reduction. The statement that it is "certain" that the collapse process takes a finite time is not correct. In the Copenhagen Interpretation one of the possible states is simply experienced.

As we know, present quantum theory doesn't permit the nonorthogonal single states be distinguished. What's more, in the framework of revised quantum dynamics, the usual measurement using physical measuring device can't distinguish the nonorthogonal single states either. But when the physical measuring device is replaced by a conscious being and considering the influence of consciousness, it can be shown that the nonorthogonal single states can be distinguished in principle in the framework of revised quantum dynamics.

But again, the original Copenhagen interpretation did allow for this. This was already done over 80 years ago, but now problems are created by then abandoning the original and experimentally confirmed model in favor of an objective collapse model. Now even with this model the EPR paradox is a problem. So it seems that in an attempt to avoid the subjective nature of the Copenhagen interpretation, and its involvement of the conscious choices of the experimenter, other interpretations such as these objective collapse models were created that now created new problems, and then consciousness is now then said to be involved, and is then trying to fit into the model that was trying to avoid consciousness!

Anyway, I know you are not defending this position, but it's fun to check it out, and to me it seems to be an incoherent way to attempt to explain consciousness. In order to explain consciousness in a materialistic way, it has to be said that matter has consciousness, and in order to avoid the problem of consciousness causing state vector collapse (because if matter has consciousness and consciousness causes collapse, then how can superpositions ever arise?), then you need to use some other interpretation of quantum theory such as objective collapse models, which then creates even more problems. Why not just use the orthodox von Neumann Interpretation that simply extends the interpretation of QM that is used in experimental particle physics?

 

[Bucky]

In the first paper:



It's funny how it is said that consciousness must be a property of matter. Through this assumption, they have made a false assumption that there are only two options to explain the integration.



Sure, this is the structure of the orthodox Copenhagen interpretation. A conscious choice on the part of the experimenter is required to orient the basis vectors to calculate the probability distributions. Attempts to eliminate this step creates the basis problem.



I don't get the logic behind saying that consciousness must be a property of matter. That consciousness is involved seems evident based on the fact that it was incorporated into the original Copenhagen interpretation, but it does not follow that it is a property of matter.



So here he is stating that he is assuming an objective collapse model, such as the GRW or Penrose Objective Reduction. The statement that it is "certain" that the collapse process takes a finite time is not correct. In the Copenhagen Interpretation one of the possible states is simply experienced.



But again, the original Copenhagen interpretation did allow for this. This was already done over 80 years ago, but now problems are created by then abandoning the original and experimentally confirmed model in favor of an objective collapse model. Now even with this model the EPR paradox is a problem. So it seems that in an attempt to avoid the subjective nature of the Copenhagen interpretation, and its involvement of the conscious choices of the experimenter, other interpretations such as these objective collapse models were created that now created new problems, and then consciousness is now then said to be involved, and is then trying to fit into the model that was trying to avoid consciousness!

Anyway, I know you are not defending this position, but it's fun to check it out, and to me it seems to be an incoherent way to attempt to explain consciousness. In order to explain consciousness in a materialistic way, it has to be said that matter has consciousness, and in order to avoid the problem of consciousness causing state vector collapse (because if matter has consciousness and consciousness causes collapse, then how can superpositions ever arise?), then you need to use some other interpretation of quantum theory such as objective collapse models, which then creates even more problems. Why not just use the orthodox von Neumann Interpretation that simply extends the interpretation of QM that is used in experimental particle physics?

I don't particularly endorse panpsychism. I just pointed out a bunch of ideas to answer your question :)

 

[Bucky]

I'm not sure I understand your point here. Searle is confused about IIT. Perhaps he should read Tononi's papers on IIT rather than Koch's book, because Tononi's papers address his points clearly. Smartphones do not process and integrate information in such a way to create consciousness; their phi is zero. It is not a version of panpsychism, either.

Then I am probably more confused than Searle is... :D
Isn't IIT arguing that a photodiode has a phi of one? If that's the case how come the diode has "1 bit of consciousness" (according to IIT) and a smartphone (or even parts of it) have none?
There are many parts of a smartphone that perform similar information-based tasks ... e.g. the gyroscope.

So the smartphone has a phi of zero because there isn't enough integration but some parts of it have a phi > 0... intriguing

 

[Neil]

Then I am probably more confused than Searle is... :D
Isn't IIT arguing that a photodiode has a phi of one? If that's the case how come the diode has "1 bit of consciousness" (according to IIT) and a smartphone (or even parts of it) have none?
There are many parts of a smartphone that perform similar information-based tasks ... e.g. the gyroscope.

So the smartphone has a phi of zero because there isn't enough integration but some parts of it have a phi > 0... intriguing

The photodiode description was over-simplified. There are some electrical tweaks needed to make that photodiode have consciousness, and it is the nature of the additional processing that gives it the one bit of consciousness. The type of processing in a smart phone does not have this quality.