Neil,
Your posts were very helpful. I think I now understand our (I think minor) difference on the objectivity of the fundamental principles of morality. I say that our differences are minor because this from your second post is very much along the lines of what I've been arguing, only using different words:
"My personal epistemology is based primarily on conscious experience and plausible reasoning. Plausible reasoning has a basis on the understanding that comes from conscious experience, which, for example, a computer could not have. The information gained is of a different logical type than a computer could possibly have through symbol manipulation, since we experience things. I suggest that this understanding based on conscious experience also gives us a basis to understand truth. Logically, understanding and truth have no basis, but when basing ones epistemology from plausible reasoning based on conscious experience, they have a basis. One can use the understanding from conscious experience to evaluate situations, even comparing incommensurable terms, to be able to rationally decide on what is more true. I don't mean "more true" in some empty sense, but literally that those things seem more true. That's not to say that this reasoning is infallible, and also not to say that logic plays no role in this reasoning since it certainly does. It should also be clear that plausible reasoning is not intuition. It is based on conscious rational consideration, based on conscious information and understanding".
Very good, we're close to seeing eye to eye. Our main sticking point remains "objectivity". I think you are looking at, for example, what it feels like to be harmed, and saying, "Sure, from a subjective perspective, being harmed feels bad, but from an objective perspective it is meaningless; it simply is what it is; we can't attach any significance to it *objectively*". On the other hand, you accept that being harmed *does* feel bad no matter who you are, and that this can, via "plausible reasoning", provide a good case for morality if we drop the term "objectivity".
So, OK, I see what you're saying with respect to objectivity, and my response is really just to clarify what that means to me. You seem to see "objectivity" as being agnostic to experience. I take a different view. "Objective" to me simply means not biased or prejudiced or based on opinion i.e. not "tainted" by one's subjective perspective, but instead based in what actually is the case when we "step outside of ourselves". And in this sense, the nature of experience can be viewed from an objective perspective which includes - rather than remains coldly agnostic towards - its personal implications. Why? Because of our goal! Recall that (by the definition I gave in my last post) we are trying to determine what we "ought to" or "should" do, in general, with respect to not just ourselves but more particularly others - and in this sense we are presupposing that the personal matters. After all, what "we" ought to do to "others" is a very "personal" question in the sense of "concerning persons, personhood and the implications of personhood".
I think then that I understand what you're saying by the objectivity of, for example, mathematical truths being contingent on axioms of the system in which they operate (I'm paraphrasing from memory, I haven't looked up what you actually said), and thus, in a way not "really" objective, but I also think that you are using a limited definition of "objectivity" there. Mathematical truths are "objective" in the sense that - given the axioms of their system - they can be derived independently of anybody's opinion, bias or prejudice, just as the fundamental moral principles are "objective" in the sense that - given that we are dealing in the personal and its implications - they too can be derived independently of anybody's opinion, bias or prejudice.
For example, given that we are concerned with the personal, we can say objectively with respect to that personal that there is a potential for suffering, with all of its negative connotations, and that sentient beings seek for self-evident reasons to avoid suffering unless they have a higher reason to submit to it, and that these premises can form the basis of objective reasoning ("beyond our personal concerns") as to what "ought" to be done given these facts.
So, perhaps we after all are seeing the same thing, but preferring to describe it with different terms. What I describe as "objectively true" you might like to describe with a term such as "inter-subjectively valid", or something like that (I noticed that you used "inter-subjectivity" or a variant of it in a past post). If so, am I kind of getting over-optimistic or do you think we might then be able to agree to this joint statement?:
"Whilst the fundamental moral principle(s) is/are ingrained in non-pathological human beings at birth, and our everyday general adherence to them is heavily backed up by our affective systems, it is / they are not arbitrary, and can in fact be derived with inter-subjective validity from the basic facts of conscious experience".
Perhaps given all of the above you can see that when in your first post you write: 'Remember, you are trying to look from "God's eye perspective" or from an objective stance, not from considering the point of view of the person or animal being harmed' this is not quite accurate. A God's eye perspective includes the experiences and points of view of all, and in asking what "ought" to be done we are asking in a sense "How do we reconcile fairly all of these different personal interests?"
You go on to ask "So in the case of eating animals, there is my interest in nourishment for my body compared to their instinct for survival. Those are not identical goals. If the animal and myself have different specific goals here, then you're saying judgment plays a role. How is that objective?" Well, let me ask you to for the sake of argument accept my assertion that vegan-fruitarianism is healthy, and to assume that you have ready access to vegan-fruitarian foods. Now, could there really be any doubt that your interest in satisfying your taste buds, or some other amusement (since that would be the only reason you could have to prefer meat to vegan-fruitarian foods given the assertions I've asked you to accept for the sake of argument) is in any way comparable to another being's interest in its very life; life itself being the very thing that allows you to taste in the first place, and thus being an obviously more primary interest? Is there really anything subjective about this judgement? Loss of flavour versus loss of life - it's a very unequal proposition, isn't it?
Laird,
Thank you for your post. This has been most helpful. I think we may have come to essentially an agreement here. I do think the term "objective" has been the issue, as well as a few remarks surrounding its use.
If I understand you correctly, you mean "objective" in the sense of how science typically refers to evidence being objective. So in the case of core harm-based moral principles, there does seem to be pretty universal norms that I think have basis in our affective systems, or essentially the question comes down to how we function neurologically an psychologically. We have a built in aversion for suffering of others. Now, it is certainly the case that each
individual will have a greater or lesser aversion to those core harm-based norms (and even entire cultures), and it is also certainly the case that a small percentage such as psychopaths may completely lack any aversion, but on average, people have an aversion to harm in others, which creates the distinction between a moral principle and a conventional rule.
I feel that moral judgments themselves happen automatically and function through our affective systems, which doesn't take away from their "objectivity," and they are fallible and prone to bias, and moral reasoning can then use conscious deliberation to consider different points of view, which may then alter the moral judgment. I may initially say that "oh, corporal punishment is right to do; it's good to teach the kid discipline," but then if I see scientific "objective" evidence that it actually does not help the child, and of course it makes them suffer, then this can then make me pause and say, "hmm, that doesn't seem right any more." The reasoning triggered a different automatic judgment, since if I don't see any benefit to something that harms a child, then it seems immoral to continue with it. Even though the judgment itself was subconscious and used my affective system, my rational consideration of evidence was able to make me see it from a different perspective and create a new judgment. So this as well lends some objectivity to the moral principles that science can give us evidence on which to base judgments. But this part will be a bit less objective in the sense that there will be issues that are not as clear, and there will be more leeway for interpreting data, but as science goes, this is where plausible reasoning plays a large role, and even if the moral concepts are not purely objective like mathematics, it will still help to shift general beliefs in moral values to being "more true."
However, we need to make distinctions as to levels of "objectivity," or inter-subjective verifiability in my usage. You have mathematics at the highest level of objectivity (logic is a subset of math), and then you can have something like evidence from physics as a lower level, and lower than that you can have evidence from neuroscience, then cognitive psychology, then social psychology, then you can have pretty difficult subjects at the lowest level such as mystical experience, which is inter-subjectively verifiable in principle, but given the nature of it, how difficult it is to obtain deep experience, as well as the content-less property and inability to communicate during the experience, it has the lowest ranking that I can think of off the top of my head of how "objective" it is and is most challenging to study.
With this considered, we should realize the level of "objectivity" of the evidence investigating moral principles. It certainly is not at the level of math or physics, but there is neuroscientific evidence and of course evidence from cognitive and social psychology (and moral psychology). So in considering this, I think it is important to see that we can study it and determine certain principles, but there can be significant variation in moral values outside a core of harm-based norms as Grorganic has pointed out. This is where it is much less objective, and there are many different perspectives and leeway for interpreting the data. But I do not have a problem with this, because in general, studying these things can at least give us insight to potentially improve consensus, or at least improve understanding of more harmless variations in cultural moral norms over time.
I think generally speaking, we have already done this automatically, and that science,
if properly practiced, can contribute to further improvement and agreement. For example, just even with the passage of time without scientific involvement, we have seen a general decrease in the tolerance of the suffering of others. a couple thousand years ago, torture as punishment was much more common, and eventually over the course of time, the norms for the severity of these punishments for transgressions have decreased (generally, of course, since extremist muslims are still quite barbaric and behind the times).
So I do think that considerations from history, neuroscience, and various forms of psychology can help to guide us in moral values. But I am concerned about the overall picture presented by the larger scientific and academic community. Currently they are quite confused, and we really haven't come very far from either a purely materialist view that is based on 19th century physics, or at best an apparently contradictory dualist view, where there are certain branches of social psychology that use concepts of Emergent Interactive Agency to describe human behavior that is
apparently in conflict with the current consensus within physics, biology, evolutionary biology, etc. The danger in the denial of free will and conscious agency from these fields is, in my opinion, dangerous, because these fields have tremendous influence in western cultures. It is troubling to see that these fields can make such profound claims of certainty on evidence that certainly does not warrant it, especially considering the social impact that it has. We have empirical evidence that denial of free will affects all kind of behavior negatively, including even racial prejudice, and claiming that racial prejudice is just an unconscious process increases its tolerance.
There is, probably of interest to you, also evidence that moral relativism reduces prosocial behavior.
If we take the materialist view seriously, and use that logical framework, you end up with no basis for moral values. However, like some areas of psychology, the fields may just go their separate contradictory ways, but the potential benefit that the other fields may have will be dampened by materialist views from the "harder" sciences. This is where my proposal comes in, because in my opinion, it unifies these disciplines and gives an explicit scientific basis to look at everything from physics to consciousness to psychology, and will help to improve our scientific knowledge so that the study of moral principles can have greater positive impact. We do have to be careful, though, because "objective data" is theory and value laden. We need to keep this in mind with interpreting data.
But to answer your last question, given the premise, I agree with you. It is the premise on which we disagree. This is a disagreement in health/nutrition research interpretation, and I must say that given the general state of these fields, it is admittedly difficult to have definitive answers due to an enormous number of factors. It is obviously clear that eating a large amount of candy bars is not good for anyone's health, but when you get into less definitive questions it becomes much more open to interpretation at this time.