Laird
Member
In another thread, Typoz wrote:
Being a little oblivious to thread etiquette, I responded at length in that thread, and at Typoz's polite suggestion, have repeated (with minor edits for context) that response in this new thread so as not to create a diversion in that original thread:
First: yes, totally agreed that belief in lack of free will is self-fulfilling.
Second: the notion of "no free will" seems incoherent to me. Typically, it is justified by determinism: we do what we do because we are caused to do it, not because we will it freely. OK, so what I do now is the result of a prior cause, which is the result of a prior cause, which is the result of a prior cause, back and back, either:
Let's take these one at a time. If there was a definite start, then conditions were such as to "generate" the ensuing history of the universe, i.e. there was a "spark" from which all of the wonders of life in their uniqueness originated. But this is creative since within it is contained the entirety of the rest of the universe, and how could such creativity be manifest except through a (creatively) free will?
If, on the other hand, causation regresses endlessly, then rather than considering an "initial spark", we can consider, "the fullness of the infinite regress in all of its uniqueness". You can tweak a cause anywhere in the regress and, magically, the entirety of the regress shifts to accommodate that cause and its endlessly changed regressions and progressions. But why is one "tweaked" version of infinity preferred over another? What "holds it in place"? And why is the entire causal chain as it is, in all of its creative glory? Surely, again, we have to recur to some (perhaps battle of) (creative) free will(s).
So, it seems to me that no matter how you look at it, the determinist alternative necessitates a creative free will in any case, and thus is incoherent as an alternative to free will - and yes, I'm conflating "free" with "creative", but really, is this such a controversial move? It seems pretty innocuous to me. And I'm also assuming that creativity on that ultimate level is impossible without free will, which perhaps is more controversial, but seems supportable: what would creativity look like in the absence of will? I haven't seen an answer to that before (then again, nor have I looked for one).
Finally, it seems to me totally bizarre to suggest that, yes, it feels exactly like we are making choices, but no, those choices aren't real but are instead wholly determined. Determined by what, exactly? I haven't been able to get a good answer to this from determinists. "Determined out of nothing in particular" seems to be what they would answer if they were consistent. But wouldn't a more realistic answer be, "Determined by a more powerful will"? Which, again, brings us back to the incoherency of determinism (as an alternative to free will).
P.S. I personally believe anyway that infinite regress, in the absence of certain mitigating qualifications, is incoherent of itself, I included it simply because it is a popular choice amongst some determinists.
Free will is an interesting one. Not everyone accepts there is such a thing. But holding such an idea may be self-fulfilling, in that if one believes one is unable to change, then one won't.
Being a little oblivious to thread etiquette, I responded at length in that thread, and at Typoz's polite suggestion, have repeated (with minor edits for context) that response in this new thread so as not to create a diversion in that original thread:
First: yes, totally agreed that belief in lack of free will is self-fulfilling.
Second: the notion of "no free will" seems incoherent to me. Typically, it is justified by determinism: we do what we do because we are caused to do it, not because we will it freely. OK, so what I do now is the result of a prior cause, which is the result of a prior cause, which is the result of a prior cause, back and back, either:
- To a definite start, or,
- Endlessly.
Let's take these one at a time. If there was a definite start, then conditions were such as to "generate" the ensuing history of the universe, i.e. there was a "spark" from which all of the wonders of life in their uniqueness originated. But this is creative since within it is contained the entirety of the rest of the universe, and how could such creativity be manifest except through a (creatively) free will?
If, on the other hand, causation regresses endlessly, then rather than considering an "initial spark", we can consider, "the fullness of the infinite regress in all of its uniqueness". You can tweak a cause anywhere in the regress and, magically, the entirety of the regress shifts to accommodate that cause and its endlessly changed regressions and progressions. But why is one "tweaked" version of infinity preferred over another? What "holds it in place"? And why is the entire causal chain as it is, in all of its creative glory? Surely, again, we have to recur to some (perhaps battle of) (creative) free will(s).
So, it seems to me that no matter how you look at it, the determinist alternative necessitates a creative free will in any case, and thus is incoherent as an alternative to free will - and yes, I'm conflating "free" with "creative", but really, is this such a controversial move? It seems pretty innocuous to me. And I'm also assuming that creativity on that ultimate level is impossible without free will, which perhaps is more controversial, but seems supportable: what would creativity look like in the absence of will? I haven't seen an answer to that before (then again, nor have I looked for one).
Finally, it seems to me totally bizarre to suggest that, yes, it feels exactly like we are making choices, but no, those choices aren't real but are instead wholly determined. Determined by what, exactly? I haven't been able to get a good answer to this from determinists. "Determined out of nothing in particular" seems to be what they would answer if they were consistent. But wouldn't a more realistic answer be, "Determined by a more powerful will"? Which, again, brings us back to the incoherency of determinism (as an alternative to free will).
P.S. I personally believe anyway that infinite regress, in the absence of certain mitigating qualifications, is incoherent of itself, I included it simply because it is a popular choice amongst some determinists.